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Amy J. Cohen*
This Symposium poses a complex, recurring question: is alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) in tension with the rule of law? Here is one quite common way
to make sense of this question. ADR is private: its various institutions seek to
evade public adjudication through informal, consensual, discretionary, and
bottom-up techniques of social ordering. Rules of law (if they are to be part of the
rule of law) are public: they "must emanate from the state, be explicit, be applied
by independent and autonomous decisionmakers, and apply generally to all
persons similarly situated."' Thus in 1984, David Trubek provocatively remarked
that ADR-with its situational and contextual techniques for resolving legal
disputes-"seems to be the negation of the idea of the rule of law."2 In the years
that followed, numerous critics indicted ADR for privatizing the functions of the
public state and, as our Symposium topic reflects, ADR proponents, in turn,
interpreted these criticisms as part of an overarching claim that ADR undermines
the rule of law.
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1. David M. Trubck, Turning Away from Law?, 82 MICH. L. REV. 824, 825 (1984) (describing
Roberto Unger's definition of a legal order according to the rule of law).
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Is Alternative Dispute Resolution Consistent with the Rule of Law?
Lessons from Abroad, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 569, 570-71 (2007). Sternlight reports that critics argue
that the privatization of dispute resolution is problematic because the elaboration of law achieved
in public trials and published decisions is necessary to protect and enhance individual rights....
[Tireating disputes as matters of individual, rather than public, concern eliminates important
public accountability. . . . [D]ispute resolution fails to serve an important educational function
when it is privatized. . .. [D]ispute resolution processes weaken[] the position of less powerful
members of society. For example, when private companies use form contracts to require their
customers or employees to resolve disputes outside the courtroom, companies have an incentive
to skew the processes in their favor... . [And] women-traditionally less powerful members of
society-may be worse off in mediation or other ADR processes than they are in litigation ....
Together, these critiques can be seen as attacking alternative modes of dispute resolution for
undermining the rule of law.
Id. at 571 (emphasis added). To understand Stemlight's conclusion-and debates about ADR's
relation to the rule of law more broadly-it is important briefly to disentangle two arguments that are
often conflated in ADR literature. The first argument is only that when judicial officers use state
power to encourage disputants to reach an agreement according to any principle other than explicit,
general legal rules, they undermine the rule of law. See, e.g., Trubek, supra note 1, at 825. This
argument is, for example, what Lon Fuller appeared to have in mind when he suggested that "a certain
incompatibility may be perceived between mediative procedures and 'the rule of law."' Lon L. Fuller,
Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305,328 (1970).
The second argument (reflected in Stemlight's conclusion above) requires more of an
interpretative leap-a leap that one could defend or attack depending on one's definition of the rule of
law. Here writers seemingly equate the rule of law with a particular vision of substantive justice or the
social good: for example, remedying structural inequalities or pursuing the ends of a discrete social
group. In this rendering, dispute processing institutions that facilitate private contractual rather than
public coercivelauthoritative dispute resolution threaten to erode the rule of law because (or so the
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Central to the critique of ADR, therefore, is the claim that ADR represents a
privatization of lawmaking and, more specifically, a shift from state to market
forms of regulation and control.4 This Article complicates that claim. It does so
not by contesting the general assertion that ADR represents a privatization of
decisionmaking or dispute resolution, but rather by exploring how ADR
proponents themselves understand the private sphere. In the 1970s and 1980s,
some of the most important architects of ADR developed dispute processing
theories and techniques through work that originated not in the private sphere of
the market but in the family: think here of Frank Sander, Robert Mnookin, and Jay
Folberg, among others. To be sure, these reformers encouraged the use of
contract-the foundational tool of the market-to resolve a range of legal
argument goes) they arc unlikely to lead to desirable substantive outcomes. Richard Reuben, for
example, interprets Owen Fiss's criticisms of ADR in this way: "Owen Fiss expressed concerns in
particular about power imbalances, authoritative consent, and the sometimes necessary continuing role
of courts in the administration of law. This Fissian view, at bottom, reflects traditional rule of law
values." Richard C. Reuben, ADR and the Rule of Law: Making the Connection, 16 DiSP. RESOL.
MAG. 4, 5 (2010) (cmphasis added). Reuben, in other words, reads Fiss as claiming that ADR
undermines the rule of law.
For the sake of conceptual clarity, it is worth observing that in rejecting ADR, Fiss was also
rejecting a classical definition of the rule of law in which legal rules serve primarily to expand the
scope of freedom of contract and preserve individual consent-indeed, Fiss called for "the pervasive
and almost continuous interventions of a state committed to improving the welfare of its citizenry."
Owen M. Fiss, The Social and Political Foundations ofAdjudication, 6 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 121, 128
(1982). Classical and neoclassical legal theorists would surely find the Fissian critique of ADR an
affront to the rule of law and, accordingly, find ADR-dcfined as consensual dispute settlement
through private contract-entirely consistent with it. See, e.g., F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM:
TEXT AND DOCUMENTS-THE DEFINITIVE EDITION 112-23 (Bruce Caldwell ed., 2007) (1944) (chapter
on planning and the rule of law). See also Amy J. Cohen, Revisiting Against Settlement: Some
Reflections on Dispute Resolution and Public Values, 78 FORDHAM L. REV 1143 (2009) (providing a
detailed textual analysis of Fiss's criticisms of ADR).
4. Fiss developed this criticism in the most detail. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 3, at 127 ("The
resurgence of the dispute resolution model is not an isolated phenomenon, but occurs within a larger
political context characterized by a renewed interest in market economics and theories of laissez-fkirc .
. . ."); Owen M. Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 YALE L.J. 1669, 1672 (1985) (describing ADR as an "assault
upon the activist state" and part of "'the deregulation movement, one that permits private actors with
powerful economic interests to pursue self-interest free of community norms"'). For more recent
articulations, see OSCAR G. CHASE, LAW, CULTURE, AND RITUAL: DISPUTING SYSTEMS IN CROSS-
CULTURAL CONTEXT 111-12 (2005) (describing ADR as, in part, a product of the trend toward
privatization popularized by the economic policies of the Reagan cra); Judith Resnik, Courts: In and
Out of Sight, Site, and Cite, 53 VILL. L. REV. 771, 796 (2008) ("[Thc] worldwide movement toward
ADR is propelled by political and social forces trumpeting deregulation and privatization and is staffed
by lawyers and other professionals seeking and shaping new markets."); Peter L. Murray, Privatization
of Civil Justice, 15 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & DISP. RESOL. 133, 135 (2007) (arguing that the
privatization of dispute resolution subjects disputes to "economic influences inconsistent with the
standards of impartiality and independence associated with public justice and the rule of law").
5. Before he began his career in ADR, Frank Sander taught and wrote in the area of family law.
See, e.g., CALEB FOOTE, ROBERT J. LEVY & FRANK E. A. SANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY
LAW (1966). Likewise, early in his career, Robert Mnookin wrote both on family law and family
dispute resolution. See, e.g., ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE: PROBLEMS AND
MATERIALS ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW (1978). Jay Folberg, another important general theorist of
negotiation and mediation, began his work in ADR with an intense focus on family disputes. See, e.g.,
JAY FOLBERG & ALIsoN TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO RESOLVING CONFLICES
WITHOUT LITIGATION, at xii-xiii (1984) ("The mediation process can be applied to a variety of
personal, social, and economic problems.... We have, however, chosen divorce and custody disputes
for many of our examples in order to draw from our professional experience and because we anticipate
the greatest immediate use of mediation in domestic conflicts.").
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disputes. But they also proposed an understanding of contract that was family-
driven as much as it was market-driven. That is, they envisioned the bargained-
for-exchange of duties and obligations among parents, children, lovers, and
friends, not simply among self-maximizing actors who stand at arm's length.
This Article thus suggests that the ways in which ADR blurs the
family/market divide, not simply the public/private one, has had a profound, albeit
unnoticed, organizing effect on the politics and promises of the field. In a wide
range of institutions and contexts, ADR has successfully introduced the idea that
people can and should manage conflict without the direct coercion of state law.6
ADR's success, I propose, reflects its embrace of two potentially paradoxical but
increasingly mutually constitutive ideas. ADR, as many analysts observe, brings
economic rationalities associated with the market to social domains-by, for
example, applying ideas of Pareto efficient contractual exchange to a range of
everyday (family, community, relational) disputes. But, as I describe here, ADR
also brings social rationalities associated with the family to economic domains-
by, for example, simultaneously describing nearly all contractual exchanges as
produced through intensely social interactions driven by emotion, empathy, trust,
solidarity, and shame. ADR, in other words, envisions communities of people
who resolve conflict, correct criminal behavior, make deals, and manage
organizations, because they are bound together-like the family-by affective,
interpersonal, intimate, localized, and ethical relationships as much as by the
mutual self-interest of the market or the collective political belonging of the
nation-state. This vision, I suggest, presents an increasingly popular (yet
normatively quite complex) construction of the kinds of societal self-regulation
that are today deemed possible and desirable from within the "private sphere."
This Article proceeds in three Parts. I begin by briefly summarizing what I
will refer to as separate spheres ideology-the idea that our normative
understandings of the family and the market are constructed in contradistinction to
one another.7 I then show how this conceptual distinction between the family and
the market shaped the development of alternative dispute processing during two
periods of time. The first period, which I introduce to frame the second, examines
how dispute processing reformers-beginning during the Progressive era and
6. For example, the U.S. Congress has directed every federal district court to establish an ADR
program, see the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1998), and the
European Union has issued a directive encouraging mediation for cross-border commercial disputes,
Council Directive 08/52, art. 1, 2008 OJ. (L 136) 6 (EU). Moreover, as scholars have shown, judges
themselves now often prefer voluntary dispute resolution processes based on contract and consensus.
See, e.g., Judith Resnik, For Owen M. Fiss: Some Reflections on the Triumph and the Death of
Adjudication, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 173, 188 (2003).
7. 1 borrow this description from Frances Olsen's foundational article, The Family and the Market:
A Study ofideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1498 (1983), and from Janet Halley &
Kerry Rittich, Critical Directions in Comparative Family Law: Genealogies and Contemporary
Studies ofFamily Law Exceptionalism, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 753, 756-57 (2010). These authors explore
how dominant legal ideologies depend on the assumption that the market and the family comprise
dichotomous spheres of social life. But I should add: my use of the separate spheres metaphor in this
Article diverges somewhat from its canonical and explicitly gendered use. Many authors utilize the
term to signify the ideological construction of a sphere of activity for women that is confined to the
nurture and care of family members in the home, and which is distinct and separate from everything
else, or rather from all the activity reserved for men. For a detailed historical excavation and critique
of the term "separate spheres," see Linda K. Kerber, Separate Spheres, Female Worlds, Woman's
Place: The Rhetoric of Women's History, 75 J. AM. HIsT. 9 (1988).
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continuing to the 1930s-distinguished alternative forums for family disputes
from alternative forums for commercial ones. In both family and market domains,
reformers characterized their innovations as informal, antiadversarial, and
extralegal. New family courts, however, were nonetheless understood as social
and public; commercial arbitration and conciliation tribunals were understood as
individual and private.
In Part 11, 1 examine how ADR scholars and practitioners in the 1970s and
1980s promoted analogous ideologies and techniques for both family and market
disputes, most commonly through the procedural techniques of mediation. Unlike
Progressive era reformers, who distinguished between the problems of the family
(described as public and social) and the problems of the market (described as
private and individual), modern ADR proponents described problems in both
domains as intensively interpersonal-and thus as both private and social, albeit
social in a different way. Or to put this point differently, while for Progressive era
reformers, "the social" was public and implicated a preexisting set of policy
concerns that encompassed the family and demanded specific interventions from
the state, for theorists of modem ADR, "the social" became private-a set of
affective, mutual relationships that individuals can and should build themselves in
the market, as much as in the home.
In this sense, I conclude, modern ADR coincides with the development of
popular theories of societal self-regulation that weave together economic self-
interest with more open-ended ideas of interdependence, affect, altruism, social
capital, and trust. This Article thus aims to shift and broaden our debate: rather
than continue to ask whether ADR undermines public governance (or the rule of
law), this Article instead invites readers critically to consider the politics and
potential distributional effects of contemporary private ordering regimes that
aspire to integrate efficiency and relationality, individualism and altruism,
economics and intimacy, the market and the family.
I. EARLY TWENTIETH-CENTURY DISPUTE PROCESSING REFORM:
DISTINGUISHING THE FAMILY AND THE MARKET
A. Introduction
This Part frames the development of modern ADR by comparison to an
earlier period of dispute processing reform. When ADR emerged as a
recognizable field in the mid-1970s and early 1980s, ADR theorists regularly
compared the resolution of family conflicts with the resolution of commercial
conflicts (as well as with conflicts often considered more public in nature).
Consider, to begin with a well-known text, the very first sentences of the first
edition of Getting to Yes.
This book began as a question: What is the best way for people to deal
with their differences? For example, what is the best advice one could
give a husband and wife getting divorced who want to know how to
reach a fair and mutually satisfactory agreement without ending up in a
bitter fight? Perhaps more difficult, what advice would you give one of
them who wanted to do the same thing? Every day families, neighbors,
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couples, employees, bosses, businesses, consumers, salesmen, lawyers,
and nations face this same dilemma of how to get to yes without going to
war.8
The dispute settlement advice that Fisher and Ury proceed to offer
encompasses families and couples as much as business, consumers, and
salesmen-all of whom share interests in mutual collaboration. In fact, Fisher and
Ury devote the final page of their famous book to the following caution: "to ask a
negotiator, 'Who's winning?' is as inappropriate as to ask who's winning a
marriage." 9 If you understand and treat your (other) negotiations fundamentally
differently from how you understand and treat your marriage, they explain, then
"you have already lost the more important negotiation-the one about what kind
of game to play, about the way you deal with each other and your shared and
differing interests."' 0 For Fisher and Ury, the ethics and expectations that (they
believe) people use to manage their marriages should inform negotiations in all
other spheres of personal and professional life.
As we shall see, in ADR writing quite broadly, the family recurs as a model
for thinking about other kinds of relationships, even in spheres that are commonly
thought to be purely commercial or transactional in nature. Today, it is in fact
entirely ordinary for ADR proponents to transfer dispute resolution models and
techniques back and forth between family and market domains. But this
conflation of paradigms is actually quite intriguing because, as Janet Halley has
shown, beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century and persisting, in
many ways, until today, American legal thought has virtually required a "division
of intellectual labor" between the law of the family, on the one hand, and "the law
of contract and, more broadly, the law of the market," on the other hand." This
conflation of paradigms, in other words, is a novelty of modem ADR thinking. In
order, then, to provide a point of comparison for contemporary ADR, this Part
provides a brief overview of dispute processing reform during the first few
decades of the twentieth century (a period that several scholars have described as-
a genealogical antecedent of modem ADR).12
To begin, in eighteenth and early nineteenth-century American law and legal
thought, the market and the family were not especially distinctive legal
institutions.13 The family, then considered a central economic unit of American
8. ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT
GIVING IN, at vi (Bruce Patton ed., 1981).
9. Id. at 154.
10. Id.
11. Janet Halley, What is Family Law?: A Genealogy, Part I, 23 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 101, 101,
105 (forthcoming 2011).
12. See, e.g., JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 95-137 (1983); CHRISTINE B.
HARRINGTON, SHADOW JUSTICE: THE IDEOLOGY AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ALTERNATIVES TO
COURT 43-101 (1985). Auerbach and Harrington present two of the most comprehensive and
important historical works on dispute processing reform during this period.
13. Halley, supra note II, at 102. Cf. MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND
THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 3 (1985). Grossberg explains that although by the
turn of the twentieth century American family law had become a distinct and special field, previously
"laws dealing with the family were strewn across the legal landscape, some to be found in diverse
statutes, others in common-law decisions on matters ranging from contracts to torts, still others in
various ecclesiastical rules." Id.
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life, included relations not only among husbands, wives, children (and other
persons related by blood or marriage), but also between employers (i.e.,
husbands/fathers) and all the various laborers that contributed to the economic
production of the household.14 Heads of households exercised similar authority
over and owed similar obligations to laborers and kin.' 5 And jurists presupposed a
legal framework in which the reciprocal rights and duties among legal persons
encompassed domestic relationships as well as employment and commercial
ones.' Thus Halley explains that in Blackstone's Commentaries, "the reciprocal
rights and duties of master and servant were equivalent to those of the husband
and wife."' 7
By the 1870s, however, the laws governing the family had begun their drift
apart from the laws governing wage labor and commercial relations. 8 New
industry, such as mills and factories, had removed significant forms of economic
production, such as manufacturing, to a space outside the household. 9 And over
the second half of the nineteenth century, jurists formulated what legal historians
today call classical legal thought-a system of legal reasoning marked by its
emphasis on individual autonomy, will theory, formal deductive logic, and the
politics of laissez faire.20 Classical legal theorists understood the market and
family to operate in quite different ways, and hence they established distinctive
legal systems for the governance of each.2' In brief, the market was imagined as
an institution organized around "individual will, private pleasures, selfish
intentions, and hard bargains," whereas the family (husband, wife, and children)
was imagined as an institution organized around "affective, sentimental, altruistic,
14. For example, Alan Dawlcy describes a typical cighteenth-century household in a rural Ncw
England community that manufactured shoes. "All of [the] elements in the production of shoes-
masters, journeymen, [workshops], tools of the trade, real property-wre fused together in the
household.... To be the head of a household was to be an oversecr of a small work team . . . ." ALAN
DAWLEY, CLASS AND COMMUNITY: THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 17 (1976). Scc also ELIZABETH
BLACKMAR, MANHATTAN FOR RENT, 1785-1850, at 57-60 (1989) and PAUL E. JOHNSON, A
SHOPKEEPER'S MILLENNIUM: SOCIETY AND REVIVALS IN ROCHESTER, NEW YORK, 1815-1837, at 43-
48 (1978) on the urban household, and MARY P. RYAN, CRADLE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS: THE FAMILY
IN ONEIDA COUNTY, NEW YORK, 1790-1865, at 25-26 (1981) on the agrarian household.
15. DAWLEY, SUpra note 14, at 18-19; JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 44-45.
16. See generally Halley, supra note 11, at 102, 106-11.
17. Id. at 107 (describing I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
(1765)).
18. See id. at 102-4.
19. See, e.g., JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN,
DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 52-53 (2004); DAWLEY, supra note 14,
at 77, 131, 224; RYAN, supra note 14, at 64-65. Of course, the gradual shift from household to
market/wage labor is a complex, multi-factorial story. For one detailed historical account of this shift
in Manhattan, see BLACKMAR,supra note 14, at 60-68.
20. For detailed historical descriptions, see Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and
Legal Thought: 1850-2000, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL
19, 25-28 (David M. Trubck & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHoDOXY 9-31 (1992);
Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of
Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940,3 RES. L. & SOC, 3,3-24 (1980).
21. See, e.g., Halley, supra note 11, at 103, 174-79 (reading James Schouler on domestic relations);
see also DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT 157-241, 174-75
(2006) (chapter on the transformation of contract) (showing, for example, that as contract came to
govern "essentially voluntary" obligations, obligations between parents and children and between
husbands and wives became the distinct domain of quasi-contract).
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ascriptive, and morally saturated" relationships. 22 As such, the family could not
be governed by the laws of contract that ordered the marketplace. Hence, Halley
explains, the market became "the domain of 'facilitation, self-determination,
autonomy and formality,"' precisely because jurists separated out and preserved
for the family legal rules "implicating 'regulation, paternalism, community and
informality."' 23 Marriage became "status-not-contract" in legal ideology, defined
through mandatory duties more than voluntary undertakings.24 And contract
became "a distinct legal topic ... in part through the gradual exile of marriage
from its domain."25 With this distinction, we also had the division of private law
into two competing domains: the first "dedicated to the human need to find
completion through the marital and parental/child relations," and the second
devoted "to humans as sole individuals free in the exercise of their wills."26
These two domains-the family and the market-became important early
sites for experimental alternative dispute processing reform.
B. The Turn to "the Social" and Dispute Processing Reform27
By the turn of twentieth century, American jurists and lawyers had begun to
question nineteenth-century commitments to formal, adversarial adjudication
following the conceptual innovations of, most prominently, Roscoe Pound.
Pound was writing against classical legal thought at a time when, as Frank
Munger notes, "[n]ot only were the social problems of immigrant labor in the
cities apparent, but also unregulated markets were damaging the organs of
business themselves, destroying political credibility, and creating pressure for
22. Halley, supra note 11, at 125, 103,
23. Id. at 183 (quoting KENNEDY, supra note 21, at 185).
24. Id. at 118, 118-67; cf GROSSBERG, supra note 13, at 21-24. Readers familiar with Henry
Maine's famous edict that "the movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement
from Status to Contract' may find this assertion surprising. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW:
ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 174
(Frederick Pollock ed., London, John Murray 1906) (1861). Halley, however, illustrates that Maine
himself in fact excluded marriage ("the portfolio of rules governing entry into, duties during, and exit
from") from the modern march to contract Halley, supra note I1, at 167-70.
25. Halley, supra note I1, at I10. For example, Halley shows that as Joseph Story and Joel Prentiss
Bishop formulated a status conception of marriage, they accordingly described contract as "defined
entirely by the will of the parties, or their mere pleasure." This understanding, she explains, "is the
famous 'will theory' of contract .... [that] would eventually morph into the ideas that contract is by
definitionfree; that the role of the state in contract is to 'let it be'-laissez faire; and that contract is the
paradigm body of law for emerging modem capitalism and its market." Id. at 140-41; see also id. at
185-88 (describing how Bishop and William A. Keener separated domestic relations from contract and
will theory).
26. Halley, supra note I1, at 165.
27. For a detailed historical analysis of "the social" as a mode of legal thought, see Kennedy, Three
Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought, supra note 20, at 37-56.
28. For a fascinating account of the nineteenth-century American decision to embrace formal
adversarial process against conciliation courts, see Amalia D. Kessler, Deciding Against Conciliation:
The Nineteenth-Century Rejection of a European Transplant and the Rise of a Distinctively American
Ideal ofAdversarial Adjudication, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 423 (2009). Kessler argues that the
American jurists, lawyers, and politicians who made this choice were motivated by their belief that
adversarial procedure would promote individualistic, egalitarian relations that, in turn, would foster a
market-based society. Id. at 478-80.
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increased intervention." 29 For Pound, the free market individualism embedded in
classical legal thought was inadequate to address the distinctively social problems
of his day: classical jurists "thought of individuals and contracts rather than of
groups and relations."30  Significantly, Pound linked the problems of
individualism not only to substantive legal rules but also to adversarial legal
forms-the "substance," he explained, of procedural law.3' "The effect of our
exaggerated contentions procedure," he argued in 1906, is to elevate law's forms
above its social purposes and to encourage actors to use law in pursuit of
individual self-interest rather than to yield to a social or public spirit.32 Formal
procedures, he reasoned, reflect and reinforce increasingly outmoded cultural
preferences against government intervention and in favor of individual initiative
and control. Thus, the model of "sociological jurisprudence" that Pound
advanced included several elements of procedural reform: for example, he called
for more flexible discretion in judging, less expensive and strategic advocacy,
and an ethos of cooperation rather than self-assertion.
Pound's idea-that through changing legal procedure, reformers could
restructure their social, political, and economic norms and order-was quite
radical for its time. Historian Amalia Kessler explains that it was only towards
the end of the nineteenth century that American jurists began to conceptualize
procedure as a distinct and powerful mechanism of social ordering apart from
substantive law.37 In the first decades of the twentieth century, reformers rapidly
translated this new attention to procedure into a series of antiformal dispute
processing reforms in both family and market domains.38
Strikingly, Pound himself envisioned a legal regime that blurred conceptual
distinctions between the market and the family just as it blurred the line between
29. Frank Munger, Movementsfor Court Reform: A Preliminary Interpretation, in THE POLITICS OF
JUDICIAL REFORM 51, 55 (Philip L. Dubois cd., 1982) (citation omitted).
30. Roscoe Pound, The End ofLaw as Developed in Juristic Thought 11, 30 HARV. L. REV. 201, 218
(1917).
31. Roscoe Pound, Some Principles ofProcedural Reform, 4 ILL. L. REv. 388, 389 (1910).
32. Roscoe Pound, The Causes ofPopular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29th
Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association (Aug. 29, 1906), reprinted in 20 J. AM. JUDICATURE
Soc'y 178, 182 (1937).
33. See Paul R. Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 739, 743
(1976) (describing Roscoe Pound, The Administration ofJustice in the Modern City, 26 HARV. L. REV.
302,306 (1913)).
34. See, e.g., Pound, Some Principles ofProcedural Reform, supra note 31, at 397-99.
35. See, e.g., Pound, The Administration ofJustice in the Modern City, supra note 33, at 315, 319
("In petty causes there ought to be no expensive advocacy ... [t]he alternative is a judge who
represents both parties and the law, and a procedure which will permit him to do so effectively.");
Pound, Some Principles of Procedural Reform, supra note 31, at 399-401 (arguing against lawyers
who use procedure as "a chief weapon of defensc" rather than to advance the merits of a case).
36. See, e.g., Roscoc Pound, A Comparison of Ideals of Law, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1, 15 (1933)
("Where the last century hewed to an ideal of competitive self-assertion, the law of today is turning to
an ideal of co6peration.").
37. Kessler, supra note 28, at 480-82.
38. Cf AUERBACH, supra note 12, at 95 (noting how in the aftermath of Pound's outspoken
criticisms of the American legal system, "there was a flurry of activity in legal circles to ... devise
new institutions, humane remedies, and flexible procedures that would make law and the
administration of justice more responsive and efficient"); see also Munger, supra note 29, at 54
("Addressing the problems articulated by Pound has become a routinized activity of bar committees,
bar-sponsored institutes, and leaders of the legal profession.").
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individual and social interests. The "infusion of social ideas into the traditional
element of our law," he argued, cuts across all areas of human activity.39 Social
interests thus required limitations on a range of individual freedoms and
entitlements granted to people both in their capacity as market participants and as
members of families-such as the use and disposition of property, contractual
freedoms, the rights of creditors, and parental rights vis-i-vis their children.40 In
both family and market contexts, "social interests," Pound explained, "are now
chiefly regarded." 41 Or, as Halley puts it, the "modernizing impulse that Pound
brought to . . . domestic relations came with an intuition that it was no different
from any other area of law: it was social, and so was the law of business."42
Pound thus called for a welfarist regulatory regime empowered, for example, "to
regulate housing, to enforce sanitation, to inspect the supply of milk, . . . to
regulate conditions and hours of labor and provide a minimum wage," and "to
administer justice in relations of family life, where conditions of crowded urban
life and economic pressure threaten the security of the social institutions of
marriage and the family." 3 Both the market and the family would become subject
to progressive social reform. Or rather, both would become subject to government
intervention that, guided by social scientific expertise, was designed to protect the
weak from the strong.4
But in the actual practice of judicial administration, two very different logics
of procedural reform took hold. Pound's push for "socialized law in socialized
courts" rapidly transformed family courts. One judge proudly proclaimed that
family court procedure "initiated the movement to supersede the traditional
individualistic point of view by a definite social policy.' According to another
judge, although the reform of legal procedure generally lagged behind the reform
of substantive law in promoting "the welfare of people" over "the rights of private
39. Roscoe Pound, Justice According to Law, 14 COLUM. L. REv. 103, 119 (1914); Roscoc Pound,
Social Problems and the Courts, 18 AM. J. Soc. 331, 336-38 (1912).
40. Pound, Justice According to Law, supra note 39, at 118.
41. Pound, Social Problems and the Courts, supra note 39, at 338.
42. Janet Halley, What is Family Law?: A Genealogy, Part II, YALE J.L. HUMAN. (forthcoming
2011).
43. Pound, The Administration ofJustice in the Modem City, supra note 33, at 311.
44. 1 do not attempt to define progressivism in this Article beyond James Ely's overarching
observations of "a broad-based reform movement" whose principle concern "was to cornect the
imbalance of economic power associated with the new industrial order.... At the heart of the reform
program lay the Progressive insistence on a more active role for both state and federal governments in
regulating the economy and meeting social problems." JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY
OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 106-07 (3d ed. Oxford University
Press 2008). For a synopsis of debates about the significant characteristics of the Progressive cra, see
David M. Kennedy, Overview: The Progressive Era, 37 THE HISTORIAN 453 (1975). Historians,
moreover, deliberate about the proper periodization of the Progressive cra, often beginning between
the 1890s and 1900 and often ending between World War I and the Great Depression. See, e.g.,
Elisabeth Isracls Perry, The Changing Meanings of the Progressive Era, 13 OAH MAG. HISTORY 3, 3
(1999); see also Steven J. Diner, Linking Politics and People: The Historiography of the Progressive
Era, 13 OAH MAG. HISTORY 5, 5 (1999).
45. HARRINGTON, supra note 12, at 68 (describing Progressive cra court reform more broadly); see
also Pound, Social Problems and the Courts, supra note 39, at 338-39; Pound, Justice According to
Law, supra note 39, at 114-18.
46. Charles Zunser, The Domestic Relations Courts, 124 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 114,
115 (1926) (quoting Walter H. Liebman, paper presented to the National Conference of Jewish Social
Workers, Atlantic City, May 1919).
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property," in domestic relations courts "one can trace the process of socialization
in the latter field [of procedure]." 47 By contrast, with the rise of progressive
legislation that cut across numerous areas of private law, business interests
promoted antiformal and antiadversarial procedures in order to evade, as one
contemporary critic argued, the "socialized orderly process of the law" through
the "laissez-faire individualism of lay arbitration." 4 Or as historian Jerold
Auerbach summarizes: "the growth of the regulatory state unsettled advocates of
commercial autonomy, who turned to arbitration as a shield against government
intrusion.""4 Thus, as I describe in the sections that follow, in the early twentieth
century, procedural dispute processing innovations in family and market contexts
pursued quite different interests and ends.
C. Family Courts: 1910s-1930s
So how did early reformers envision new informal procedure as either social
or individual, or as either public or private? Bepinning in 1910, domestic
relations courts cropped up throughout the country, o and were often renamed
family courts as they consolidated jurisdiction over matters involving "the security
of the home": s1 for example, nonsupport or abandonment of wives or children,
paternity, divorce, child custody, adoption, guardianship, neglect and abuse of
children, and matters formerly handled in juvenile court.52  The first properly
named "family court" was established in Ohio in 1914," and was defined by
Judge Charles Hoffman as a court with exclusive jurisdiction over "all matters
relating to the family ... in which the same methods of procedure shall prevail as
47. Edward F. Waite, Courts of Domestic Relations, 5 MINN. L. REV. 161, 162-63 (1921). Judge
Waite described domestic relations courts as a product of a larger wave of court reform that included
juvenile courts, small claims courts, minimum wage commissions, and legal aid bureaus. Id at 163.
48. Philip G. Phillips, Rules of Law or Laissez-Faire in Commercial Arbitration, 47 HARv. L. REV.
590, 617 (1934).
49. AUERBACH, supra note 12, at 101.
50. See, e.g., F. R. Aumann, Domestic Relations Courts in Ohio, 15 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 89,
89(1931).
51. REGINALD HEBER SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR: A STUDY OF THE PRESENT DENIAL OF
JUSTICE TO THE POOR AND OF THE AGENCIES MAKING MORE EQUAL THEIR POSITION BEFORE THE
LAW 73 (1924).
52. Indeed, much early literature was devoted to analyzing the problems of fragmented jurisdiction
and calling for consolidated "family courts." See, e.g., Arthur J. Lacy, What the Detroit Court of
Domestic Relations Accomplished, 25 AM. LEGAL NEWS 5, 13 (1914) ("[L]ct me emphasize the
tremendous advantages of a court with combined jurisdiction over all family cases .... The present
system of non-support cases in one court, abandonment in another, divorces in a third and children in a
fourth, tends to nullify the power of each court for good . . . ."); Aumann, supra note 50, at 89 ("For
really effective results all cases involving family problems should be handled in one court."); Herbert
Harley, Business Management for the Courts, 5 VA. L. REV. 1, 11 (1917) ("The branch Court of
Domestic Relations, though a tremendous success from the beginning, falls short of the ideal, for it has
no divorce and no felony jurisdiction. What is essentially one controversy may still, in Chicago, be
adjudicated piecemeal in the Municipal Court, the Probate Court, the Juvenile Court, the Criminal
Court, and so forth."); Pound, The Administration ofJustice in the Modem City, supra note 33, at 313
(describing the "waste of judicial power" and expertise when "different phases of the same difficulties
of the same family" must be heard by a number of different (juvenile, domestic relations, criminal,
equity, and law) courts).
53. LYNNE CAROL HALEM, DIVORCE REFORM: CHANGING LEGAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES 117
(1980).
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in the Juvenile Court and in which it will be possible to consider social evidence
as distinguished from legal evidence."5 Juvenile courts, inaugurated by
progressives around the turn of the century, were similarly designed to provide
"'social justice' in contrast to 'legal justice,"' especially for poor, working class,
and immigrant families through processes of conflict prevention, treatment, and
reform.55
Modeled on juvenile courts, new family courts shared the following
characteristics. First, they were emphatically antiformal. As political scientist F.
R. Aumann declared, "[flormalities in bringing action, producing evidence and
conducting proceedings are not present here."5 Second, they promoted
conciliation-a method of dispute processing in which court officials use their
authority to promote settlement and agreement rather than litigate disputes.5 7
Whereas adversarial litigation "embitter[s]" family members against one another,
legal aid advocate Reginald Heber Smith argued, conciliation gives court staff the
"chance to repair, reunite, and construct" without necessarily invoking formal
law.58
Third, these courts were explicitly extralegal-they combined informal and
antiadversarial proceedings with social scientific expertise aimed at the resolution
of conflicts that were frequently described as "social" rather than purely legal in
character. In other words, not only were family conflicts negotiated with
conciliatory techniques that did not track formal legal procedure, they were
understood as ripe for scientific diagnosis and prescriptions aimed at treatment
and reform. "Commentators who have had experience with the work of the
'domestic relations' or 'family court,"' Aumann explained, "believe that it should
be looked upon as a social agency rather than as an agency to enforce criminal
54. Charles W. Hoffman, Social Aspects of the Family Court, 10 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY409, 416 (1919). See also HALEM, supra note 53, at 117.
55. HARRINGTON, supra note 12, at 53-55 (describing the "treatment-oriented disposition" of
juvenile courts in which "'[tihe end sought [is] adjustment of a social difficulty rather than the
punishment or penalization of the defendant') (citation omitted). For a detailed analysis of the
creation ofjuvcnilc courts, see ROBERT M. MENNEL, THORNS & THISTLES: JUVENILE DELINQUENTS IN
THE UNITED STATES, 1825-1940, at 124-57 (1973).
56. Aumann, supra note 50, at 91.
57. See, e.g., Lacy, supra note 52, at 5 ("The prime actuating motive [of the Detroit Court of
Domestic Relations] was to restore families to normal conditions wherever possible, to stop family
litigation rather than to encourage it, to save unnecessary arrests ... . [W]e aimed never to arrest even
a guilty man until every conciliatory method utterly failed."); see also Zunser, supra note 46, at 117,
124 (suggesting that "'reconciliations'. . . are sometimes effected by the courts . . . before a case
reaches the magistrate" and calling for further efforts to "perfect machinery for bringing about
reconciliations or arrangements ofseparate support without recourse to the law itself").
58. SMITH, supra note 51, at 80-81. He observes further that
[als the domestic relations courts have applied themselves to the fast growing problem of
desertion and non-support they have more and more employed the method of conciliation. The
interest of the state in these cases is that homes should not be broken up except for grave causes
and that families should be reunited whenever possible. A litigious proceeding is destructive, it
is calculated to embitter the contestants, and after a trial in open court husband and wife feel a
real grievance toward each other where before there may have been only a temporary discontent.
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law or decide technical controversies between litigants."59 According to another
report,
[o]ne of the judges who sits in the Domestic Relations Court has said that
if the letter of the law were followed, it would be a purely financial court.
... Fortunately the judges do not hold too rigidly to the letter of the law
and some very excellent social work is done in this court, and plans for
the enlargement of its powers are already underway.6
Judges thus freed themselves from the constraints of technical, formal laws (which
enabled them to resolve only financial disputes) so that they could call upon social
scientific expertise to reform families in conflict.6' Or as the director of one
court's "department of research and statistics" observed: "While the main issue
arising in Courts of Domestic Relations is an economic one, the conditioning
factors are physical, mental and social" and therefore "present a wide variation
from the usual legal situations which courts are called upon to adjust."62
"Domestic difficulties," she added, are "social problems," which require "the
continuous application of the scientific principles developed in Medicine,
Psychology and Sociology." 63 Family conflict, in all these conceptions, is social
and psychological and therefore quite different from usual legal/economic matters.
Progressive reformers and judges thus self-consciously understood family
courts as agents of social reform, and not simply institutions to resolve legal
disputes. Even more significantly, they also understood these courts-with their
ad hoc, particularistic, and nonuniform techniques-as public rather than private.
To supporters, family courts embodied the progressive and utterly public
assumption of duties and obligations that were previously administered through
the private family group. Through informal conciliatory procedures, the state
could demand that the family behave in solidaristic, virtuous, and altruistic
ways." As one commentator noted, "family courts provide a striking illustration
59. Aumann, supra notc 50, at 92 (emphasis added).
60. Mary E. Paddon, The Inferior Criminal Courts of New York City, II J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 8, 14 (1920).
61. For a historical analysis of how family conflict became the scientific subject of the new
professional field of social work, see LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES: THE POLITICS
AND HISTORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE, BOSTON 1880-1960, at 59-81 (1988).
62. Louise Stevens Bryant, A Department of Diagnosis and Treatment for a Municipal Court, 9 J.
AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 198,198 (1918).
63. Id
64. For precisely this reason, later analysts would criticize family and juvenile courts as a crucible of
social control-for example, as "tribunals for the poor, geared toward protecting lower class children
from the baneful influences of their home and community and indoctrinating them in the values and
standards of the middle class." HALEM, supra note 53, at 118. For a classic class-based account of
early juvenile courts as a tool to control the poor, see ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE
INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY (1969); see also MARY E. ODEM, DELINQUENT DAUGHTERS:
PROTECTING AND POLICING ADOLESCENT FEMALE SEXUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1885-1920, at
111-21, 128-56 (1996) (showing how progressives used the juvenile justice system to supervise and
reform working-class and poor teenage girls accused of "sex delinquency" or other moral offences, and
to instruct their families as well). For a historical account of client agency within family and juvenile
institutions, see Linda Gordon, Family Violence, Feminism, and Social Control, in RETHINKING THE
FAMILY: SOME FEMINIST QUESTIONS 262 (Barrie Thorne with Marilyn Yalom eds., 1992). Cf ODEM,
id. at 160-84 (showing how immigrant and working-class parents attempted to use juvenile courts as a
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of the performance by society of functions that of old fell to the council of the kin.
... It compels deserters to support their families and sees to it that deserving and
unfortunate women and children are placed under the protection that will help
them toward self-maintenance."65  In other words, family court reformers used
state power-in the form of conciliatory, therapeutic judicial interventions-to
transform the problems of the weak (women, children) into matters of social
concern. Or, as another writer argued, "The history of the growth and
development of family courts represents the increasing consciousness of the
community that these cases are a public responsibility. These cases present social
problems that require adjustment, and their solution is a community
responsibility."66 Resolving these cases are a public or communal duty, reformers
explained, because the family, not the individual, is the primary unit through
which society and the nation-state is reproduced.67 "In affairs of such import [as
wrongs in the home]," Smith proclaimed, "denial of justice transcends individual
or personal injustice and, like a cancer, eats into the health and moral well-being
of the body politic."68 Thus, in sum, in family domains, progressive reformers
rejected formal adversarial adjudication, not to promote individual autonomy, let
alone to "privatize" public conflict, but rather to promote social welfare, collective
responsibility, and the national public good.
D. Commercial Arbitration: 1910s-1930s
During this same period that family courts spread throughout the United
States, reformers also called for alternatives to litigation for a variety of other
dispute types." In the area of commercial litigation, the growth of alternatives
tool to discipline their daughters and enculturate them according to their own norms and moral
standards). It is worth noting that during this period, courts generally upheld legislation creating
juvenile courts against due process challenges. See, e.g., Lindsay v. Lindsay, 100 N.E. 892, 895-96
(111. 1913) (surveying the law in several states).
65. 3 ARTHUR CALHOUN, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN FAMILY FROM COLONIAL TIMES
TO THE PRESENT 175 (1919).
66. L. B. Day, The Development of the Family Court, 136 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SC.
105, 109 (1928); see also Lacy, supra note 52, at 10 ('The disintegration of a family is a matter of
public concern.").
67. See, e.g., Charles W. Hoffman, Courts of Domestic Relations, Report of the Committee of the
National Probation Association, 8 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 745, 745 (1918) ("It is
conceded by the judges, by probation officers, and by social welfare workers . . that 'the unit of
society is not the individual, but the family, and whatever tends to undermine the family . . . will
crumble and destroy the foundations of society and the state."'); id. ("[Tihe family is the mechanism
which delivers over to the nation the raw material, or the partially improved material, out of which the
nation must be composed.") (Albion Small's remarks); Zunscr, supra note 46, at 114 ("The family is
the basis of social life, upon its integrity and stability rests, in the last analysis, the whole fabric of
society. . . ."). For a historical analysis of how this idea-that the family provides the raw material to
construct the nation-state-became a necessary construct for modem state-family dynamics, see
JACQUES DONZELOT, THE POLICING OF FAMILIES 227-33 (Robert Hurley trans., 1979).
68. SMITH, supra note 51, at 73.
69. Beyond the family, they recommended conciliation to resolve a range of minor civil and criminal
disputes, most often within legal institutions designed to serve the urban and immigrant poor. On the
spread of conciliation to small claims and municipal courts, see, e.g., id. at 60-67. In these more
marginalized arenas, as Auerbach explains, dispute processing reforms "limped along" developing
slowly at "the periphery of a legalistic culture." AUERBACH, supra note 12, at 97, 101.
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rivaled procedural transformations in the area of family law. In 1914, the New
York State Bar Association created the Committee on the Prevention of
Unnecessary Litigation (soon renamed the Committee on Arbitration).' Over the
course of the 1920s, several states enacted statutes making agreements to arbitrate
valid, enforceable, and irrevocable,72 and in 1925, Congress did the same. In
1926, the American Arbitration Association was founded,74 and in 1927, then
Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover, called commercial litigation "the largest
single item of preventable waste in civilization" next to war.75
Like their family court counterparts, reformers in the arena of trade and
commerce argued for new informal procedures that could bring a range of social
experience and social expertise to bear on legal disputes. As Duncan Kennedy has
shown, this idea of "the social" as a mode of legal thought cut across a spectrum
of left/right ideologies and arguments. Illustrating Kennedy's point, writings on
commercial arbitration regularly included the observation that traders and
merchants had created norms and practices better suited to their own social needs
and conditions than formal courts. For example, in 1917, William Ransom,
former Justice of the City Court of New York, argued that "business men eschew
litigation" because of a gap between court procedure and the substance of their
conflicts.77  "[S]omehow," he wrote, "the organization, procedure and
administrative routine of [the] court hark back to an era which the business
community outside has necessarily superseded, in order to hold its own in the
commercial competition of today."78 Courts had become insufficiently responsive
to the needs of their users, Ransom explained, because they were governed by
cumbersome, technical, and inefficient evidentiary and procedural rules rather
than "present-day business methods for ascertaining facts and determining
controversies."79
70. See, e.g., IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION,
INTERNATIONALIZATION 25 (1992). Macncil suggests that what he calls arbitration "evangelism"
began in 1911. Of course, arbitration has a much longer history in the United States. For an overview
of arbitration stretching back to the seventeenth century, see AUERBACH, supra note 12, at 19-68. See
also Bruce H. Mann, The Formalization of Informal Law: Arbitration Before the American Revolution,
59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 443 (1984).
71. Julius Henry Cohen, The Law of Commercial Arbitration and the New York Statute, 31 YALE
L.J. 147,147-48 (1921).
72. For a detailed analysis, see MACNEIL, supra note 70, at 34-47. At common law, agreements to
arbitrate were revocable. See, e.g., WESLEY A. STURGES, A TREATISE ON COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATIONS AND AWARDS 45-46 (1930) (defining and explaining revocability).
73. The Federal Arbitration Act made arbitration agreements in maritime and commercial
transactions "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract." See Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 § 2, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43
Stat. 883 (1925) (codified at 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)).
74. For descriptions, see ROBERT COULSON, VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION IN ACTION: THE STORY OF
THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION 7 (1976) and MACNEIL, supra note 70, at 40-41.
75. Edgar J. Lauer, Conciliation: A Cure for Congested Court Calendars, 27 LEGAL AID REV. 1, I
(1929).
76. Kennedy, Three Globalizations, supra note 20, at 39.
77. William L. Ransom, The Layman's Demand for Improved Judicial Machinery, 73 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 132, 151 (1917); see also William L. Ransom, The Organization ofthe Courts
for the Better Administration ofJustice, 2 CORNELL L.Q. 261, 266-67 (1917).
78. Ransom, The Layman's Demand for Improved Judicial Machinery, supra note 77, at 147.
79. Id. at 145, 147-48. Ransom inveighed the legal community to take seriously such criticisms of
judicial procedure that emanated from "conservative and constructive" quarters--criticisms, he
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For proponents of commercial arbitration and conciliation, this gap between
legal procedures and social conditions animated particular kinds of procedural
reforms, such as decisionmaking that incorporated extralegal expertise like
"knowledge of trade conditions and customs."80 The Chamber of Commerce of
the State of New York, for example, instructed arbitrators that when a commercial
dispute involves "law points" they should "disregard pure technicalities and go to
the merits. If they believe that the legal proposition is based upon sound sense
and the experience of mankind generally, they should follow it." 8' It urged
arbitrators, in other words, to make decisions based on their experiences and
perceptions, rather than technical or formal legal logic. Thus, in commercial
arbitration, as in family courts, studied expert discretion would trump formal legal
rules. And like their family court counterparts, commercial reformers spoke of
interdependence and reconciliation. They proposed that conciliatory procedures
could promote "good will and friendliness" rather than "hostility and enmity." 82
"[A] discharged employee may be re-employed," another New York judge
reasoned, "or an interrupted business relationship may be resumed where a dispute
is adjusted without the bitterness left by a fight in court."83
Despite these commonalities, however, commercial and family dispute
processing reform followed different courses. If the conciliatory procedures
administered in family courts were understood to be both public and social-
adjusting mandatory familial relationships of duty and dependence on behalf of a
national social good-commercial conciliation and arbitration were understood to
be individual and private-carving out a private space in which contracting equals
could adjust their own economic relations in the marketplace.84 Indeed, the push
to arbitration reflected the antipathy that many businessmen expressed towards
explained, that were entirely different from the humanitarian's concerns that judicial decisions thwart
"their projects of human betterment." Id. at 140.
80. SMITH, supra note 51, at 69.
81. Id.; see also JULIUs HENRY COHEN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAW 3 (1918)
("[Merchants seek arbitration because] [t]hey are trying to get their questions settled in accordance
with their instincts and habits of thought.").
82. Edgar J. Lauer, Conciliation and Arbitration in the Municipal Court of the City of New York, I J.
AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y 153, 155 (1918).
83. Id.
84. The little writing I can discover on the application of arbitration to family disputes during this
period is consistent with my description of distinct and separate logics for dispute processing reform in
family and market domains. In his 1000-plus page treatise on arbitration, Wesley Sturges reported that
few cases consider whether the "disputes of husband and wife [are] of such a special character that
they cannot be determined by under a submission to arbitration." STURGES, supra note 72, at 212.
Given the "special" nature of domestic relations, Sturges himself proposed that only domestic disputes
that "are of sufficient pecuniary and nondomestic character" appear proper for arbitration. Id. at 212-
13. "[I]t seems doubtful," he ventured, that
the courts will recognize an [arbitration] award which determines the existence or nonexistence
of a cause for separation, divorce, or alimony. Much less, it seems, would the courts recognize
an award which purported to grant any such readjustment of the marital relationship, or which
disposed of the rights or duties of the parties with respect to children.
Id. at 213. Similarly, Sturges reported that it was unclear if parties could arbitrate "disputes involving
the validity of a will, as measured by the rules of law concerning the capacity of the testator or
testatrix, or concerning the execution of the document, or concerning the legality of the devises,
bequests and legacies therein provided"-that is, Sturges doubted that arbitration, rather than probate
court, could decide questions of capacity, dependency, and family status (all matters that were
presumably considered noneconomic). Id. at 212.
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courts. For example, one lawyer, William Potter, lamented that courts are
"avoided by everyone who has his own business interests at heart."8' "The delays
in the administration of justice and the manner in which the rights of liberty and
property are bandied about," he explained,
has led intelligent and progressive men in practically every trade and
department of commerce to organize tribunals for the administration of
justice.. . . [L]umber dealers, hay dealers, grain dealers, fruit shippers,
potato shippers, coal dealers, furniture dealers, and many other branches
of commercial enterprise . . . . resort to their own tribunals to settle
dispute from choice.86
During a time when, as historians have widely observed, judicial attitudes towards
social welfare legislation were "anything but uniform or monolithic,"87 the
business community called for private process and private law that they could
make through their own contracts (and presumably in the substantive directions
they desired).
85. William W. Potter, Give Judiciary Greater Power: Efficiency Organization for Courts Points
Way out of Dilemma-Curtailment of Judicial Power a False Solution, 6 J. AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y
164, 165 (1923); see also Percy Werner, Voluntary Tribunals: A Democratic Ideal for the Adjudication
of Private Differences Which Give Rise to Civil Actions, 3 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOc'Y 101, 101 (1919)
(describing a "growing distrust of our courts").
86. Potter, supra note 85, at 165 (emphasis added). As the title of his article suggests, Potter wanted
to rehabilitate the reputation ofjudicial institutions.
87. WILLIAM G. Ross, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND LABOR UNIONS
CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890-1937, at 16 (1994). Ross explains that
[t]he traditional view ... that the courts of the progressive cra were recalcitrant defenders of a
rigid doctrine of laissez-faire, has given way to an increasing recognition that the courts were
remarkably amenable to progressive reforms. In addition to making many modifications to
common law that had the effect of subordinating property rights and liberty of contract to broader
communal rights, the courts upheld far more progressive measures than they struck down.
Id. at 16-17. Legal scholars have similarly challenged "the traditional Lochner story that the period
from 1900 to 1920 was an cra in which courts regularly thwarted all regulation." Victoria Nourse, A
Tale of Two Lochners: The Untold History of Substantive Due Process and the Idea of Fundamental
Rights, 97 CAL. L. REV. 751, 754 (2009). As Victoria Nourse explains,
The Progressive Era . . . was full of reform and regulation, from trust-busting to railroad
regulation to labor injunctions; from consumer protection and the federal reserve to worker's
compensation; from regulations of drink, lotteries, fight films, and stolen cars to seditious speech
to birth control-and the Court's case law did little to squelch any of these regulatory impulses,
for good or ill.
Id; cf David E. Bernstein, Lochner's Legacy's Legacy, 82 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 33-34 (2003) (cataloguing
instances of "redistributive regulatory legislation" upheld during the Lochner cra); Michael J. Phillips,
The Progressiveness of the Lochner Court, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 453, 479-83 (1998) (cataloguing
instances of legislation regulating trade and business upheld during the Lochner cra).
88. Or at least this was clearly among the reasons that both contemporary commentators and modem
historians have identified as motivating the business community's push for arbitration. For example,
in their comment on the Federal Arbitration Act, Julius Henry Cohen and Kenneth Dayton argued that
enforceable agreements to arbitrate correct three problems faced by the business community in courts:
(1) delay, (2) expense, and (3) "the failure, through litigation, to reach a decision regarded as just when
measured by the standards of the business world" (due, they explained, to the application of general
rules and lay juries without sufficient understanding of commercial disputes). Julius Henry Cohen &
Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REv. 265, 269 (1926). But see Ransom,
The Layman's Demand, supra note 77, at 148 (arguing that it was inefficient, uneconomical,
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Consider, for example, how Percy Werner crafted his proposal for
commercial arbitration (which caught the attention of the New York Chamber of
Commerce in 1914 and was later passed as a resolution adopted by the Bar
Association of the State of Missouri).89 Werner explained that in the United
States, a new social jurisprudence was emerging that emphasized social or
community rights not only individual ones.9 "But self-respecting individuals," he
continued,
having an honest difference between them ... who desire nothing further
than a speedy settlement in strict accordance to the law ... will search in
vain for a reason why this may not be had . .. by creating a voluntary
tribunal . . . . The time of our state courts will be given to the
adjudication of cases involving community rights, in the decision of
which all citizens are interested. 9
By proposing that public courts devote their time to matters of communal or social
concerns, Werner did not challenge what he described as "the wise administration
of that vast and steady stream of social legislation that is so characteristic of our
young and growing republic."92 To the contrary, he distinguished public disputes
from private ones. "[T]o be publicly haled into court to settle a mere private
dispute," he argued, "unless all other methods failed, might rather be regarded as
an invasion of the sacred right of privacy."93 Courts, he argued, "are instruments
by which the organized community exercises its supremacy over the individual." 94
This supremacy is appropriate, he stipulated, in cases involving public or
community rights.95 By contrast, for "private differences between individuals,"
Werner called for "a democratic procedure" that was voluntary and conciliatory.9
For Werner, arbitration resuscitated the ideals of voluntary consent, freedom of
contract, and individual privacy inoculated from government control.
Thus, in distinction to their domestic relations counterparts, advocates of
procedural reform in commercial contexts promoted extralegal process,
cooperation, and compromise to facilitate private autonomy, not the public or
social good. At the same time, however, they did not attack the "wise
nonuniform, and time-consuming procedures, not "a desire to avoid the application of rules of law
which [drove] business men out of the courts").
89. Percy Werner, Voluntary Tribunals: A Democratic Ideal for the Adjudication of Private
Differences, supra note 85, at 102, 109-10; see also Percy Werner, Voluntary Tribunals: A Democratic
Ideal, 2 VA. L. REV. 276 (1914).
90. Werner, Voluntary Tribunals: A Democratic Ideal for the Adjudication of Private Deiferences,
supra note 85, at 102.
91. Id. at 103.
92. Id. at 104.
93. Id. (emphasis added).
94. Werner, Voluntary Tribunals: A Democratic Ideal, supra note 89, at 276.
95. Id. at 276-77.
96. Werner, Voluntary Tribunals: A Democratic Ideal for the Adjudication of Private Differences,
supra note 85, at 103. See also Percy Werner, Voluntary Tribunals Functionally Considered, 7 VA. L.
REV. 110, 114 (1920) ("Is it speaking too broadly to say: Public courts for public issues, private courts
for private issues .... ?").
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administration of ... social legislation" that was proliferating all around them.97
To the contrary, they sought to carve out spaces for the resolution of "private
disputes" in which the public interest could not intervene.98 Or as Auerbach
concludes, "the stronger the regulatory state, the stronger the desire for spheres of
voluntary activity beyond its control."9 Proponents of commercial autonomy
used arbitration "to insulate private rule-making from government control and to
remove business disputes from the courts."'0
By the 1930s, New Dealers explicitly attacked commercial arbitration as an
assault on the regulatory state.' 0' In 1934, for example, Philip Phillips offered a
"deep social objection" to the mandatory enforcement of arbitration agreements:
"that the government, through its courts, would be entirely deprived of control
over business disputes, unable to lay down social policy, unable to insure
standardization through properly worked out rules of law, unable perhaps even to
reach in upon disputes involving constitutional questions."'0 2 A decade later,
Heinrich Kronstein assailed the development of business arbitration as private
governance "divorced from an ideal of social justice" that should alarm anyone
"who would place public interest before private gain." 03
These criticisms notwithstanding, commercial arbitration continued to gain
popularity over the following decades within the legal and business communities
because it mediated larger shifts from individualistic theories of law to social
97. Id at 104. In fact, some proponents of commercial arbitration argued that it was precisely
because of the benefits of new social regulation that contracts to arbitrate commercial disputes should
be enforceable by courts. In his testimony before Congress on the federal arbitration bill, Julius Cohen
explained that previously courts were unwilling to enforce arbitration contracts via specific
performance because of bargaining inequalities between the partics. "[T]he real fundamental cause" of
nonenforcement Cohen asserted, "was that at the time this rule was made people were not able to take
care of themselves in making contracts, and the stronger men would take advantage of the weaker, and
the courts had to come in and protect them." Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint
Hearings on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before the Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary, 68th
Cong. 15 (1924) (statement of Mr. Julius Henry Cohen). Social conditions are different now, Cohen
declared in 1924: "we have the regulation of the Federal Government, through its regularly constituted
bodies, and they protect everybody. Railroad contracts and express contracts and insurance contracts
are provided for. You can not get a provision into an insurance contract to-day unless it is approved by
the insurance department. In other words, people are protected to-day as never before." Id Cohen
thus argued that new background regulatory rules made it both acceptable and desirable for Congress
to permit traders and businessmen to contract as equals to opt out of court supervision and to hold them
to the terms of their agreement.
98. Here is how Charles Bernheimer, Chairman of the Committee on Commercial Arbitration of the
NY Chamber of Commerce, expressed this ideal:
Whatever course [the parties see] fit to adopt [is] no matter of public concern, and affects no
question of public policy, and if they [see] fit to make an agreement, otherwise valid, that they
would forbear to pursue their remedy by action in the courts of this state, there is no public policy
which renders that agreement invalid.
Charles L. Bcrnheimer, Introduction to J. COHEN, supra note 81, at x-xi (1918) (quoting a New York
State Supreme Court case upholding a contract in which a plaintiff agreed not to enforce a judgment in
New York).
99. AUERBACH, supra note 12, at 101.
100. Id. at 105.
101. Id. at 112.
102. Philip G. Phillips, Commercial Arbitration Under the N.R.A,, I U. CHI. L. REv. 424, 433 (1934).
103. Heinrich Kronstein, Business Arbitration-Instrument of Private Government, 54 YALE L.J. 36,
36, 67 (1944).
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ones.'0 It did so not by directly attacking the infusion of social concerns into
American law, but rather, far more modestly, by suggesting, as Lon Fuller argued
in 1941, that there is a "proper sphere" for "the rule of private autonomy." 05
Fuller supposed that "the most familiar field of regulation by private autonomy"
(or what he called "law-making by individuals") is "that having to do with the
exchange of goods and services."1'" And, as Duncan Kennedy observes, Fuller's
sphere of private governance "extends beyond to partnerships and collective
bargaining agreements." 0 7 But make no mistake: "[t]he family was implicitly
but firmly excluded." 08
In sum, during the first few decades of the twentieth century, progressives
used the tools of procedural informality and extralegal expertise to advance
public/social ends in family disputes, whereas advocates of commercial autonomy
used a similar set of tools to enable individual actors to advance private ends in
market ones. Consistent with separate spheres ideology, dispute processing
reformers understood family conflict as the proper concern of society and the
nation-state, and preserved private individual rule-making for matters such as
commerce and trade. In the Part that follows, I turn from early twentieth-century
reforms to the modern ADR movement. As we shall see, rather than theorize the
family as social and public, and the market as individual and private, modern
ADR reformers describe the challenge of managing interpersonal relationships
across the family/market divide. As the president of the American Arbitration
Association, Robert Coulson, put it in 1983: "All disputes, at bottom, are
interpersonal[, flrom the most intimate family disagreements to complicated
reallocation of resources . . . ."
II. THE BEGINNINGS OF MODERN ADR: MAKING THE FAMILY LIKE THE
MARKET
A. Introduction
In the 1970s, elite judges, lawyers, and law professors were again gripped by
the idea of procedural reform. Several analysts have therefore noted broad
commonalities between the innovations of the modem ADR movement and early
twentieth-century dispute processing reforms." 0 But although ADR proponents
themselves regularly invoked the legacy of Pound (even naming their foundational
104. For example, Aucrbach reports that "by the 1950s, according to one estimate, nearly three
quarters of all commercial litigation was being diverted from courts to arbitrators." AUERBACH, supra
note 12, at 113-14.
105. Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 809 (1941).
106. Id.
107. Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller's
"Consideration and Form," 100 COLUM. L. REV.94, 125 (2000).
108. Id.
109. Problem Solving Through Mediation: Conference Proceedings (December 1-2, 1983), in
DIsPUTE RESOLUTION PAPER SERIES No. 3, at 10 (Maria R. Volpe and Thomas F. Christian eds., 1984)
(Coulson's remarks).
110. See, e.g., Jessica Pearson, An Evaluation of Alternatives to Court Adjudication, 7 JuST. SYs. J.
420, 420 (1982) (suggesting that 1970s architects of ADR echoed "the litany of criticism directed at
courts by Roscoe Pound and other Progressive era reformers").
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conference after his 1906 essay, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice"'), the movement they inspired had little in common
with Pound's early ambitions to achieve the "socialization of the law.""'2 To the
contrary, modern ADR proponents resoundingly criticized a description of law as
a tool to advance social ends. In law review articles and conferences, they
discussed the intrinsic difficulties in reaching consensus about what social ends, in
fact, are: they emphasized the challenges of making reliable predictions about
human desires and behavior, of understanding the "real" interests of individuals
and groups, and of formulating rational decisions under conditions of uncertainty
and imperfect knowledge. "3 One commentator even described the anfuish of
family court staff forced "to agonize over other peoples' life decisions."' ADR
proponents thus promoted procedural informality for reasons of private autonom
and individual self-determination in family contexts, not simply in market ones."
Of course, by the time ADR emerged in the mid-1970s, background
understandings of the family had shifted significantly. It became entirely
plausible (in fact necessary) to understand the family not as a social formation but
as a compilation of individuals with constitutional rights,"'6 and as people who, as
equal rights-bearing individuals, can and should contract with each other."7  A
dispute processing innovation of the 1950s signifies a mid-point towards this
transition. In 1958, Judge Louis Burke published a book describing his role in the
Los Angeles County Conciliation Court. He began by recounting how it was
precisely when he realized that marriage is emphatically a contract, that he also
understood how judges could assume radically different procedural roles." 8 "[I]f
a court can enforce contracts of all types," he reasoned, "then surely a court may
enforce a contract whereby the parties agree to live together in marriage and
behave toward each other in certain specific ways.""l9 Burke and his team thus
drafted contracts (in mindboggling detail) to delineate responsibilities and
111. See Addresses Delivered at the National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction
with the Administration ofJustice, 70 F.R.D. 79 (1976).
112. Pound, Social Problems and the Courts, supra note 39, at 341.
113. See generally Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face
ofIndeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226 (1975) (describing the indeterminacy of the best
intcrest standard, the lack of social consensus about proper child-rearing norms, and the impossibility
of predicting the cffccts of various custody regimes); Anne E. Meroney, Mediation and Arbitration of
Separation and Divorce Agreements, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 467, 469 (1979) ("[Pjarties fear the
power of a judge ... to decide the course of their lives based on a few minutes' contact and subjective
observation."); Meyer Elkin, Divorce Mediation: An Alternative Process for Helping Families to
Close the Book Gently, 20 CONCILIATION CTs. REV. iii, at v (1982) ("[J]udges and attorneys .. . arc set
up by society as 'experts' but in reality know very little about the family involved and what is best for
it.").
114. Ann Milne, Custody of Children in a Divorce Process: A Family Self-Determination Model, 16
CONCILIATION CTs. REV. 1, 1 (1978).
115. See, e.g., Janet Maleson Spencer & Joseph P. Zammit, Mediation-Arbitration: A Proposal for
Private Resolution of Disputes between Divorced or Separated Parents, 1976 DUKE L.J. 911, 912-13
(advocating for divorce and custody mediation/arbitration with minimal state involvement in order to
enhance parents' freedom of choice).
116. In the 1960s, for example, children's rights advocates launched an assault on the antiadversarial,
informal, and "socialized" procedures of the juvenile courts, winning significant due process
protections in the Supreme Court decision, In re Gault, 387 U.S. I (1967).
117. See Frances Olsen, The Politics ofFamily Law, 2 LAW & INEQ. 1, 11 (1984).
118. LouIs H. BURKE, WITH THIS RING 23 (1958).
119. Id. at 30.
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obligations for, among other things, household labor, finances, leisure, privacy,
and sex. 120
On the one hand, Judge Burke anticipated a new model: he conceived of
spouses as contracting units, and he used highly individualistic and liberal
language to describe and enforce their contracts. For example, he instructed
parties to return to court to request a hearing if they felt they could not abide by
the terms of the agreement, and for those who breached he stood ready to (and
sometimes did) issue orders of contempt.121 On the other hand, Burke's work was
reminiscent of older social therapeutic interventions in family disputes-his
conciliation contracts expressed a deep therapeutic consciousness and an
explicitly normative judicial agenda to properly socialize the family. Even more,
these contracts were drafted in mandatory counseling sessions compelled by the
court. Hence Caleb Foote, Robert Levy, and Frank Sander's 1966 family law
casebook invited students to question the legitimacy of these intrusions into
family life. In a fictional debate, one commentator proclaimed:
Damn it, marriage is a private affair. When I think of the Judge's court
issuing orders telling people not to speak harshly to one another or how
often to go to bed together or what technique to use in making love-
well, it sickens me. It must be unconstitutional. Isn't there some
amendment that prohibits that sort of prying into the intimacy of one's
private life? 122
The operative theme captured in this quotation (followed by a reference to the
newly promulgated Griswold v. Connecticut 23) is the constitutionalization of the
right to family privacy against social control. But rather than divide family
members into adversarial, rights-bearing units consigned to fight out their disputes
in court, the newly emergent ADR movement had a different, indeed
transgressive, solution in mind.
B. The Market Model of Family Mediation
In the 1970s, ADR scholars and practitioners proposed borrowing ideas about
dispute processing from the market-typically from business and labor
relations-to restructure a range of domestic disputes (for example, divorce,
custody, premarital negotiations, domestic violence, child welfare, youth
offenders, inheritance and the division of estates). O.J. Coogler, who founded the
Family Mediation Association in 1975, began his pioneering book by analogizing
the problems of the separating family to those of "a partnership of any kind."' 24
Through mediation, he explained, parties could contract to divide their property
120. See id. at 270-80.
121. See id. at 31-32, 77-85; see also ROGER ALTON PFAFF, THE CONCILIATION COURT OF Los
ANGELES COUNTY 8 (1963).
122. FOOTE, LEVY & SANDER, supra note 5, at 792.
123. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
124. O.J. COOGLER, STRUCTURED MEDIATION IN DIVORCE SETTLEMENT: A HANDBOOK FOR
MARITAL MEDIATORS, at xv & I (1978).
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yet maintain "the ongoing business initiated by the partnership."1 25  Numerous
other writers compared family conflict to labor-management conflict and hence
subject to similar contractual techniques for resolution.126 For example, in 1969,
Coulson published an article encouraging family dispute resolution practitioners
to employ dispute settlement techniques already widely used and accepted in
commercial and labor contexts.127
Most of these theorists proposed mediation-that is, contractual negotiations
facilitated by a third party--as an optimal strategy for resolving family disputes
and for opting out of court adjudication. Advocates of what I thus call the
"market model of family mediation" made clear that they rejected the social-
therapeutic conciliatory interventions of early twentieth-century family courts to
remedy the relations of the home. Eager to inoculate themselves from the specter
of social control that haunted Progressive era reforms, they instead described
volitional forms of private ordering. 28 Robert Mnookin, for example, proposed
that family mediators could facilitate "parental resolution of the custody dispute,
rather than the broader tasks of 'curing' or 'treating' the parents." 29 Jay Folberg,
then president of the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts, was more
emphatic: mediation, he insisted, is not a therapeutic but rather "task-directed and
goal-oriented" process that utilizes contract to resolve conflict among people in a
variety of (domestic, social, business, labor) relations.'30  Coulson proposed
enabling "parties to design their own settlement machinery," rather than subject
125. Id. at 1; see also Ann L. Milne, Divorce Mediation-An Idea whose Time has Come?, Wis. J.
FAM. L. 3, 5 (1982) ("The family's similarity to a corporate entity cannot go unnoticed.... As with
the termination of a corporation and perhaps its reorganization into a new legal entity, we find a
parallel with that of the divorcing family.").
126. JOHN M. HAYNES, DIVORCE MEDIATION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR THERAPISTS AND
COUNSELORS 7 (1981) ("The concept of a divorce mediator advanced in this book is modeled on that
of a labor mediator."); Kenneth Kressel et al., Mediated Negotiations in Divorce and Labor Disputes:
A Comparison, 15 CONCILIATION CTs. REV. 9 (1977); James R. Markowitz & Pamela S. Engram,
Mediation in Labor Disputes and Divorces: A Comparative Analysis, 2 MEDIATION Q. 67 (1983); Joel
M. Douglas & Lynn J. Maicr, Bringing the Parties APART: Divorce Mediation's Debt to Labor
Mediation, 49 DISP. RESOL. J. 29 (1994). Labor-management conflict, of course, has its own rich and
distinctive history in the United States that I do not describe here. However, it is worth noting that in
the 1970s, labor scholars were far from sanguine about efforts to extend labor arbitration and
mediation to disputes that were not organized around collective bargaining. See Julius G. Getmant,
Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 916, 933-34 (1979) ("When labor arbitration
has been successful, it is because collective bargaining has established a rough equality and mutual
respect between the parties .. . not (because of] the establishment of a particular system of dispute
resolution.... The intimate relationship between labor arbitration and collective bargaining makes its
value as a precedent for dispute resolution in other contexts doubtful.").
127. Robert Coulson, Family Arbitration-An Exercise in Sensitivity, 3 FAM. L.Q. 22 (1969).
128. Critics of family ADR would eventually level precisely this attack. Robert Levy, for example,
described new nonadversarial techniques of fanily dispute resolution as deeply interventionist and
reminiscent ofjuvenile courts, which he noted were once "a prominent and admired progressive ideal."
Robert J. Levy, Custody Investigation in Divorce Cases: The New York Law Revision Commission
Proposal in Perspective, 19 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRoBs. 485, 487, 490 (1985). Cf Martha Fineman,
Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking,
101 HARv. L. REV. 727, 731-34, 760-68 (1988) (describing child custody mediation as the
embodiment of therapeutic ideas that delegalize and depoliticize custody battles to the detriment of
mothers).
129. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication, supra note 113, at 289.
130. Jay Folberg, A Mediation Overview: History and Dimensions of Practice, I MEDIATION Q. 3, 8
(1983).
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them to the conciliatory interventions of "well-meaning social workers, court aids
and other appointees."' 3 ' Patricia Vroom, Diane Fassett, and Rowan Wakefield
made clear that family mediation envisions responsible individuals capable of
making their own choices and decisions: "Mediation is attractive because it is not
saddled with the negative connotations of weakness or sickness often associated
with therapy. Mediation clearly assigns responsibility to the disputants for
working through their own conflicts."l 32
Many other proponents described family mediation as a process through
which individual family members could engage in predictable, reciprocal
exchange by learning to make their own interests and obligations explicit and
concrete through contracts that specify, for example, "who? is to do what? for
whom? under what circumstances?" 33 Each mediation principle, another family
mediation theorist explained, is a "'contractual norm, a commonly understood and
agreed upon prescription for acceptable behavior, which ... specifies the rules to
be observed as well as the sanctions that may be applied for their violation."'
34
In 1981, John Haynes devoted a portion of his book on family mediation to
teaching family members "how to trade." 35 The problem, he explained, is that
people within families are often uncomfortable and inexperienced in using
exchange-based norms to govern the distribution of resources and entitlements.
Rather than behave like market actors, family members either understand
themselves as altruists and thus they refuse (on moral or emotional grounds) to
take ("Oh, I can't do that; it's not right").'3 6 Or they understand themselves as
individual rights-holders with legal entitlements and refuse to give ("Why should I
give a? I am entitled to b and should get it anyway").' 3 7 Thus, Haynes reasoned,
"begins the process of explaining the legitimacy of offering concessions in return
for other concessions."'138 Building on these ideas, in 1982 Charles Bethel and
Linda Singer proposed to use mediated contracts to remedy cases of low-level
131. Coulson, Family Arbitration, supra note 127, at 23. Although Coulson would later become an
important proponent of family mediation, in this 1969 article he is arguing for the application of
arbitration to family disputes.
132. Patricia Vroom et al., Winning Through Mediation: Divorce Without Losers, in ALTERNATIVE
MEANS OF FAMILY DISPUTE RESOLUTION 3,4 (Am. Bar Ass'n eds., 1982); see also JOHN M. HAYNES
& GRETCHEN L. HAYNES, MEDIATING DIVORCE: CASEBOOK OF STRATEGIES FOR SUCCESSFUL FAMILY
NEGOTIATIONS 5-9, 9 (1989) (distinguishing mediation from therapy: "reorganizing interpersonal
dynamics is the work of a therapist, and negotiating agreement over issues is the work of a mediator");
Joan B. Kelly, Mediation and Psychotherapy: Distinguishing the Differences, I MEDIATION Q. 33
(1983).
133. Richard B. Stuart et al., An Experiment in Social Engineering in Serving the Families of
Predelinquents, 4 J. ABNORMAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 243, 245 (1976); see also HARRINGTON, supra note
12, at 127-29 (describing Stuart et al. and explaining that local mediation centers used analogous
techniques to develop "a contractual agreement regarding future behavior").
134. Sarah Childs Grebe, Structured Mediation and its Variants: What Makes it Unique, in DIVORCE
MEDIATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 225, 229-30 (Jay Folberg & Ann Milne eds., 1988) (quoting
JEFFREY Z. RUBIN & BERT R. BROWN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF BARGAINING AND NEGOTIATION
13(1975)).
135. HAYNES, supra note 126, at 74-76.
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domestic violence (especially when victims-for reasons of either financial
support or love-wished to evade the coercive apparatus of criminal law). 39
Thus, in the 1970s and early 1980s, family ADR advocates reconceived the
family as a site of contractual relationships in terms that reflected a renewed
commitment to the privacy and autonomy of the individual as well as to a
decreased role for the state in family (as well as market) affairs. While their
predecessors explicitly conceptualized the family as public and social, and thus as
a receptacle for specific normative interventions worked out through conciliatory
procedures directed by the state, modem reformers constructed the family as
private-a space where individuals could use contract to arrange their own norms
and obligations. Coulson, for example, described the devolution of control over
dispute resolution (for a range of conflicts) as "the essence of personal
freedom."'4 To that end, he and several other ADR proponents emphasized the
similarities, rather than dissimilarities, between the resolution of family and
commercial disputes-particularly with respect to the role the state should play in
each.141 "The state," Folberg proclaimed, "should use its increasingly precious
resources to intervene in economic relationships between adults only when all
efforts for private ordering or settlement fail."' "Divorcing parties," he added,
"should be free to contract between themselves, and they should be encouraged to
do so." 43 Or as Ann Milne, Chairperson of the Association of Family and
Conciliation Courts, argued: divorcing parties "ought to be free to contract
between themselves regarding the financial, estate planning and parenting details
of their marriage and divorce. Resultant agreements may be enforceable as with
any other contract and subject to challenge by one of the participants on the
139. Charles A. Bethel & Linda R. Singer, Mediation: A New Remedy for Cases of Domestic
Violence, 7 VT. L. REV. 15 (1982). The authors offer several examples of the kinds of contracts they
draft; for example:
I, Spencer W., agree to return all record albums and one tape of Arctha Franklin, Amazing Grace.
I also agree not to hit or choke Ms. M. anymore. While under the doctor's care whatever
hospitalization does not cover, Mr. W. will pay for. This includes doctor visits and prescriptions.
Id. at 22 n.1 3. Or:
I, Barbara M., and I, Damez S., hereby agree to end the relationship that has existed between us.
I, Barbara M., will continue to live at my mother's house and I, Darnez S., will continue to live at
my mother's house.
Id. at 23 n.14. Or:
I, William S., agree that I will not physically harm in any way my wife, Rita S., or my three
children, Daryl, Roger, and James.
I, Rita S., agree that I will talk and communicate with Mr. S. on any subject provided Mr. S
has not been drinking when he approaches me.
Id. at 23 n.15.
140. Problem Solving Through Mediation, supra note 109, at 10 (Coulson's remarks).
141. Cf Olsen, The Family and the Market, supra note 7, at 1517 (describing the historical
liberalization of the family and arguing that the family is presently assuming "more of the
characteristics associated with the free market"). Olsen herself extended the legal realist critique of the
free market to family relations. Just as legal realists endeavored to render incoherent the idea of state
nonintervention in the free market, she argued that the idea of the "private family" masks innumerable
policy choices supported and enforced by the state. Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention
in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 835,835-37 (1985).
142. Folberg, A Mediation Overview, supra note 130, at I1.
143. Id.; see also Jay Folberg, Mediation of Child Custody Disputes, 19 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS.
413,419 (1985) ("Family mediation furthers the policy of minimal state intervention.. . .").
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grounds of fraud."'" From this perspective, families constitute private economic
relations; even upon their dissolution, families, like market actors, should be
encouraged to govern themselves through contract rather than become subject to
the intervention of the state. And because family members are analogous to
market actors, their contracts are analogous to market contracts: courts, ADR
proponents therefore advised, should refuse to enforce mediated contracts only if
they find "fraud or overreaching" among adults or "neglect and abuse" when
children are involved.145
Early ADR proponents thus self-consciously described family ADR as a form
of "private ordering" that, in Mnookin's words, is "premised on the notion that ...
bargaining involves rational, self-interested individuals."'" "Family fights are
susceptible to rational bargaining," Coulson similarly inveighed.'47 Carl Dibble, a
family mediator, summarized these ideas as follows: "[B]argainers may
legitimately prefer their own to others' or the common interest. .. . Labor is
expected to prefer labor's interest, and management, management's."148 Why,
Dibble asked, should family mediation be subject to different standards? 49
Yet the development of family ADR was analytically complex. Market
model theorists clearly brought to the family free market ideas of private contract
and individual self-interest. But they did not necessarily refuse, as either a
conceptual or political matter, traditional distinctions between the market and the
family. For some, these distinctions crept in gradually. For example, Coulson
recounts:
At first I saw the role of the [family] mediator as limited to helping
parties bargain, much as union and management do in labor relations, but
I gradually realized that the function was more complex, involving
collaboration, enhanced communications, behavioral modification, and
family therapy, in addition to traditional negotiating skills. 50
Others always, if also sparingly, described the family and the market as distinctive
entities even as they blurred the differences between them. Mnookin, for
example, reminded his readers that the family is a space of affection and mutual
144. Milne, Divorce Mediation, supra note 125, at 5.
145. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 957 (1979).
146. Robert H. Mnookin, Divorce Bargaining: The Limits on Private Ordering, 18 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 1015, 1019 (1985).
147. ROBERT COULSON, How To STAY OUT OF CouRT 90 (1984). He advised separating spouses,
whenever possible, to "[flollow the basic principles of contract negotiation. Think about what your
opponent wants. What concessions are you willing to make? How can you get the best possible
agreement for the future?" Id. at 92. Cf ROBERT COULSON, FAMILY MEDIATION: MANAGING
CONFLICr, REsOLVING DISPUTES 94-95 (2d ed. 1996) ("A spouse is not a customer, so arms-length
bargaining may not be appropriate between them.... Still, parties should not lower their expectations
to encourage collaboration. Some concessions may eventually be necessary to reach agreement, but
caving in up front is not one of them.").
148. Carl M. Dibble, Bargaining in Family Mediation: Ethical Considerations, MEDIATION Q. 75, 83
(1984) (cataloguing debates within the field of family mediation for and against bargaining, and
offering his own qualified defense of bargaining).
149. Id. at 75.
150. CouLsoN, FAMILY MEDIATION, supra note 147, at xi.
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self-interest.' 5' Folberg observed "the strong emotional forces" in families
"require measures more delicately wrought than those that can be provided in a
court-imposed solution."' 52 "The legal system," he maintained, "is not able to
supervise or enforce the fragile and complex interpersonal relationships between
parents and children ... ."1' Thus, even at moments of family dysfunction and
breakdown, these market model theorists did not revert to a purely transactional
(self-interested/rational) paradigm to negotiate family conflict. Rather they
promoted a different-and more idealized paradigm-one characterized by
ongoing relationships and complex emotional ties.
To be sure, some important early advocates of family ADR never embraced
the market model. Their writings are fill of appreciation for the specificity of the
family as a site of conflict. Consider Frank Sander's lengthy observations in
1983:
I believe that family disputes have particular promise for the
alternative movement.... A number of points strike me as special about
family disputes. First, they often involve parties who are not fully
competent, such as children and the mentally disabled. Obviously,
these individuals require special procedures and protections....
.... Feelings are often so intense that we may justifiably question
whether the normal legal processes will be effective. . . . [W]e often
must deal with individuals who have serious personality pathologies....
Still another important characteristic of family disputes is that the
very nature of family relations means that we often are dealing with
continuing relationships.154
Sander repeatedly invoked the family's special characteristics-intensely
emotional relationships, inequality, irrationality, interdependence-as a
justification to remove family disputes from adversarial adjudication.'55 For
example, he described the famous case of McGuire v. McGuiret56-in which a
wife asked a court to order her miserly husband to transfer financial resources to
151. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication, supra note 113, at 266.
152. Folbcrg, A Mediation Overview, supra note 130, at 9.
153. Folberg, Mediation of Child Custody Disputes, supra note 143, at 420.
154. Frank E. A. Sander, Family Mediation: Problems and Prospects, 2 MEDIATION Q. 3,5-6 (1983).
155. See also, Frank E. A. Sander, Towards a Functional Analysis of Family Process, in THE
RESOLUTION OF FAMILY CONFLICT: COMPARATIVE LEGAL PERSPECTIVEs xi, at xii (John M. Eckelaar
& Sanford N. Katz ods., 1984); see also Daniel G. Brown, Divorce and Family Mediation: History,
Review, Future Directions, 20 CONCILIATIONS CTs. REV. 1, 5-8 (1982) (summarizing arguments that
suggest that adjudication is too "coldhearted" for family disputes); HOWARD H. IRVING, DIVORCE
MEDIATION: A RATIONAL ALTERNATIVE TO THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 14-16 (1980) (describing
divorce as "unique among legal actions because it is invariably accompanied by intense and intimate
emotions" and thus as better suited for voluntary settlement that can operate on emotional as well as
intellectual levels).
156. 59 N.W.2d 336 (1953).
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her-not as an economic but as "fundamentally a relational dispute" that called
for a meditative process including conciliation, therapy, or counseling.'57
Many other family mediators did not reject the market model per se but rather
redescribed the distinctiveness of the family as a source of ethical dilemmas
within the model. For example, in 1982, Crouch invited his readers to consider
the problem of "too-aggressive bargaining" in family mediation that could
facilitate the "exploitation of the weaker by the dominant party."'5 In 1984,
Sydney Bernard, Joseph Folger, Helen Weingarten, and Zena Zumata debated
whether the family mediator, unlike the labor mediator, should try to minimize
acquisitive or risk-taking behavior or discourage the commodification of party
preferences (e.g. trading money for kids). 59 That same year, Dibble described
what he saw as a normative divide in the field. Should family mediators, he
summarized, "choose to tolerate and encourage impersonal, acquisitive,
manipulative, instrumentally rational values" of the marketplace, or rather should
they "defend those distinctive values of the family (and intimate relationships)
such as personal regard, respect for autonomy, sharing, and appreciating intrinsic
goods."'" Thus as soon as the family was assimilated into a voluntary,
contractual model for dispute resolution (contiguous with the model widely used
for business and labor disputes), its distinctiveness remerged in the form of
questions about ethics, responsibility, and fairness.
In sum, family ADR, as it developed over the course of the 1970s and 1980s,
reflected an uneasy mix of two modes of human interactions that were kept
largely distinct by early twentieth-century dispute processing reformers. On the
one hand, market model advocates borrowed the assumption from theorists of
market-based exchange that individuals involved in family disputes are private,
individual, and self-interested actors. On the other hand, virtually all proponents
of family ADR emphasized the importance that emotions and notions of altruism
and duty play in family disputes and their resolution. Family ADR never
157. Sander, Towards a Functional Analysis of Family Process, supra note 155, at xv (cmphasis
added). We can trace Sander's understanding of mediation most readily to Lon Fuller who, in 1970,
defined mediation (unlike contract) as a process that "reorient[s] the parties toward each other .. . by
helping them to achieve a new and shared perception of their relationship, a perception that will
redirect their attitudes and dispositions toward one another." Fuller, supra note 3, at 325. Fuller
argued that mediation is therefore best suited to non-market relationships. "It is fairly obvious," he
asserted,
that mediation has scarcely any role to play in human relationships fluidly organized on what
may be broadly described as the market principle. If X finds A, B and C all competing to supply
his needs through rival contractual arrangements, he may need the services of an expert adviser,
but he will scarcely have occasion to call on those of a mediator. Likewise, in a society where
transient and freely terminable sexual alliances took the place of marriage it is hardly likely that
there would develop any institutional practice comparable to "marriage therapy." Mediation by
its very nature presupposes relationships normally affected by some strong internal pull toward
cohesion.
Id. at 314. For Fuller, this "person-oriented" quality of mediation most paradigmatically encompasses
relations between spouses, but also encompasses, for example, relations between labor unions and
employers-rclationships that he, in turn, distinguished from business deals marked only by the
performance of reciprocal obligations governed by "act-orientated" contractual rules. Id. at 326-34.
158. Richard E. Crouch, Divorce Mediation and Legal Ethics, 16 FAM. L.Q. 219, 240-41 (1982).
159. Sydney E. Bernard et al., The Neutral Mediator: Value Dilemmas in Divorce Mediation, 4
MEDIATION Q. 61, 63-65, 70 (1984).
160. Dibble, supra note 148, at 78 (describing the reasoning of those who argue against bargaining in
family mediation).
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produced any uniform resolutions to its dual impressions of the family as a
collection of self-interested individuals who possess values that they can
commodify and exchange and as a collection of people bound together by ethical,
affective, and solidaristic commitments. In 1987, Howard Irving and Michael
Benjamin thus simply observed that "there remains no consensus concerning the
status of self-interest bargaining in [family] mediation. Some are in favor, others
against."1'6 But by 1987, 1 would argue that something far more conceptually
powerful than a split in the field over bargaining had taken place.
C. Political Critiques, Depoliticized Mediations
First, by the mid-1980s, concerns about the special characteristics of the
family developed into a full-blown feminist assault-one, I would speculate, that
Sander saw coming. "[W]e in the family law field," he cautioned in 1983, "have
so far escaped the sharpest criticism [of ADR], but I have no doubt that we, too,
will get our share." 62 Immediately after he published these words, feminists
assailed the dangers posed to women and children by the expansion of market
logics into family domains. They proposed to limit ADR to nonfamily disputes
and interactions. For example, in 1984, the National Center on Women and
Family Law (a legal services organization focused on domestic issues) published
an article explaining that "'alternate dispute resolution' lends itself more
appropriately to arm's length disputants possessed of equal bargaining and
financial power and information, not to 'unequal' matrimonial partners."' 63 The
following year, Laurie Woods, director of the Center, described mediation as an
effort to reprivatize family conflict that (like the market) levels class-based
inequalities.'" Family disputes, she argued, do not represent "intra-class
controversies ... amenable to mediation," but rather embody conflicting social
and economic interests linked to the poverty of women.' 65 The Battered Women's
Advocates Caucus passed a resolution in 1983 declaring mediation "always
inappropriate with respect to any issue (be it related to violence or not) where
there has been any act or threat of violence against a woman or child."'"
Nor were these critics reassured by family ADR's valorization of affect,
interdependence, and intimacy, not simply rationality and self-interest. For them,
the family was better described as a space of deeply gendered and unequal power
relations. Men reproduced social and economic inequalities through the family-
this problem was structural and political and therefore not amenable to correction
through a proposal to distribute resources and entitlements via the tools of the
market (bargaining and contract) even if these tools could be modified to
161. See, e.g., HOWARD H. IRVING & MICHAEL BENJAMIN, FAMILY MEDIATION: THEORY &
PRACTICE OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 55 (1987) (internal citations omitted).
162. Sander, Family Mediation, supra note 154, at 5.
163. Harriet N. Cohen, Mediation in Divorce: Boon or Bane?, WOMEN'S ADVOC. (Natl Ctr. on
Women & Family Law, New York, N.Y.), March 1984, at 1.
164. Laurie Woods, Mediation: A Backlash to Women's Progress on Family Law Issues, 19
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 431 (1985).
165. Id. at 435.
166. Resolution on Mediation Passed by the Battered Women's Advocates Caucus of the 14th
National Conference on Women and the Law, Washington, D.C.. April 10, 1983, WOMEN'S ADVOC.
(Nat'l Ctr. on Women & Family Law, New York, N.Y.), July 1983, at 3.
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anticipate intensely emotional and/or altruistic behavior. If anything, feminists
predicted that under structural conditions of "private" inequality, women, overly
endowed with relational and affective traits, would be even further exploited by a
regime of voluntary negotiated exchange. 6 1
These feminist critics thus labored to preserve a distinction between the kinds
of dispute resolution processes appropriate for the market versus those appropriate
for the home on explicitly normative and political grounds. At the same time,
however, market model theorists, and most especially Robert Mnookin, aimed to
use ADR's double understanding of the family-one that sought to mute the
apparent contradictions of individualism and altruism, rationality and affect,
economics and intimacy-to build more general and ambitious theories of dispute
resolution. Mnookin offered a model of ADR in which conflicting needs and
desires-indeed conflicting experiences of one's self as market actor and family
member-could be balanced and managed. For him, this model stood apart from
right/left ideology and male/female structural inequality. 68 Mnookin, we shall
see, proposed a grand-scale and depoliticized mediation.
In 1979, he and Lewis Kornhauser recommended the reform of legal
procedures governing divorce and custody disputes in their famous Bargaining in
the Shadow of the Law.'69 Their key innovation was purposefully to blur the
boundaries between the public and private, law and norms, and self-interest and
concern for others. To that end, they borrowed Lon Fuller's idea of "'law' that
parties bring into existence by agreement," 70 as well as Melvin Eisenberg's idea
of negotiation as not simply an exercise in bargaining power and horse trading,
but rather as also "a norm-bound" process involving principle, rule, and precedent
that "determine . . . outcomes, even when they conflict with self-interest." "'7
(Eisenberg, in turn, derived his understanding of negotiation in part from
observations of preindustrial family dispute resolution. 72)
Mnookin and Kornhauser therefore envisioned a theory (and practice) of
private lawmaking and dispute settlement that combined contractual exchange
with normative negotiation and that could accordingly integrate the dual model of
the family imagined in ADR. This theory, they insisted, could encompass the
complex interaction between parties' preferences (rational self-interest but also
altruism and spite) and norms (seemingly, rules and principles parties articulate
167. Cf H. Cohen, supra note 163, at I (arguing against mediation's "exaltation of the 'emotional'
aspects of the divorce"). By the mid-1980s and early 1990s, family mediation had generated a sizable
feminist critique. Important contributions include Lisa G. Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases:
The Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57 (1984);
Martha Shaffer, Divorce Mediation: A Feminist Perspective, 46 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 162 (1988);
Fineman, supra note 128; Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100
YALE L.J. 1545 (1991); Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics of
Power, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 441 (1992).
168. See, e.g., infra note 176.
169. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 145.
170. Id. at 950, n.1.
171. Id. (citing Eisenberg); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-
Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REV. 637,638, 650 (1976).
172. Eisenbeg, supra note 171, at 640-43 (quoting at length from P. H. GULLIVER, SOCIAL CONTROL
IN AN AFRICAN SOCIETY: A STUDY OF THE ARUSHA: AGRICULTURAL MASAI OF NORTHERN
TANGANYIKA (1963)).
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through reasoned elaboration).173  It could also encompass parties' appetite for
risk and strategic behavior-in part because analysts would understand all these
interactions as shaped and regulated by background rules of state law.'74 In a
1985 article, Mnookin clarified that "[s]ome might think that the stresses and
emotional turmoil of separation and divorce undermine the essential premise of
private ordering-individuals' capacity to make deliberate judgments. I
disagree."' Nor was he indifferent, in general terms, to feminist concerns about
bargaining inequalities.'76  To the contrary, Mnookin envisioned a negotiated
contractual regime that could absorb, diffuse, and address these critiques.
Emotional relationships, as well as power imbalances and externalities, he argued,
can and should be managed within the institution of private ordering-at times by
disputants themselves (or their advocates) and at times by the state, which retains
the power to alter baseline bargaining endowments, add procedural protections, or
intervene in "unusually one-sided bargain[s]."1" Mnookin thus derived a model
of private ordering-based on, he argued, the twin ideals of individual liberty and
efficient exchange-by theorizing the affective, unequal, and duty-bound relations
of the family not simply the arms-length, rational bargaining of the
marketplace.'78  He and Kornhauser concluded their seminal piece with a
prescient claim: "certainly," this vision of dispute settlement "has implications far
broader than family law." 79
D. Dispute Processing Across the Family/Market Divide
By the 1990s, as ADR advanced and progressed, general theorists of ADR
began to see the features that once appeared particularly salient in family contexts
as emblematic of all bargaining situations. 80 For many, if not most, ADR
proponents, the sort of affective, interdependent relationships that long defined
family disputes in fact defined disputes in a wide array of (nonfamily/market)
contexts. In other words, the combinations of relational norms and economic
173. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 145, at 968, 973.
174. Id. at 966-74.
175. Mnookin, Divorce Bargaining, supra note 146, at 1021.
176. Id. at 1024-31 (generally discussing relative bargaining power). Feminists, howcvcr, observed
that Mnookin's discussion of bargaining power evaded structural and political questions of
male/female inequality. Martha Shaffer, for example, argued: "Throughout his discussion of
bargaining inequality, Mnookin uses nonsexist language, implying that either husband or wife may
have the upper hand on any one of these dimensions. While this is certainly true of individual
relationships, it ignores the forces of gender hierarchy operating on a societal level." Shaffer, supra
note 167, at 179.
177. Id. at 1023.
178. Id. at 1017-19.
179. Mnookin & Komhauscr, supra note 145, at 997.
180. Family mediation "experienced its most dramatic growth" between 1980 and 1989. GEORGE
PETER STONE, FAMILY AND INTERPERSONAL MEDIATION: A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE PERIODICAL
LITERATURE 1980-1989, at 7 (1991). In fact, by the 1990s, family mediation had switched from a
later-comer, following (in the 1970s) on the heels of labor and commercial arbitration and conciliation
(and thus as a recipient of techniques honed in those more sophisticated market contexts), to one of
ADR's most entrenched, foundational, and fertile areas of practice. By 1996, for example, Coulson
could write that "[micdiation is not only being used for family disputes but in employment, insurance,
and general business to help disputants avoid court." COULSON, FAMILY MEDIATION, supra note 147,
at 33 (emphasis added).
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efficiency that Mnookin and others were working out in the 1970s and 1980s
became, by the 1990s and 2000s, the dominant discourse of the field.' 8 ' In 2000,
for example, Mnookin and his coauthors published a book that combined lessons
in efficiency maximization with social-psychological proposals to manage "the
tension between empathy and assertiveness" that is present, they argued, in nearly
all negotiations.182  In 2006, Folberg, in his book with Dwight Golann on
negotiation, combined lessons in hard bargaining with lessons on managing
emotional and interpersonal relationships. 83  Around the same time, Leonard
Riskin (another important early proponent of family mediation) began to pioneer
dispute resolution writings on "mindfulness."'1' He proposed that individuals can
improve all of their personal and professional negotiations if they learn to self-
regulate their "impulses, fears, passions, thoughts, and habitual assumptions and
behaviors." 85  In 2005, Roger Fisher published, with Daniel Shapiro, a book
devoted to the following overarching claim: in "virtually every negotiation"
nearly everyone desires "appreciation, affiliation, and autonomy" and, moreover,
nearly everyone is concerned with perceptions of their "status and role."' 86  To
illustrate these arguments, moreover, these authors moved seamlessly between
examples of disputes in family and market domains.' 87
Unlike their early twentieth-century predecessors, these modem ADR writers
clearly do not commend the use of conciliatory, informal, and antiadversarial
procedures by public institutions in order to advance a preexisting national or
181. See, e.g., Robert J. Condlin, "Every Day and in Every Way, We are All Becoming Meta and
Meta" or How Communitarian Bargaining Theory Conquered the World (of Bargaining Theory), 23
OHIO ST. J. DisP. RESOL. 231, 238-45 (2008) (describing the dominance of communitarian and
relational ideals in negotiation and ADR theory). I should add: I do not mean to suggest that family
dispute resolution, while significant, was the only model that ADR theorists drew upon to import a
discourse of affect, community, and social cohesion into market domains. Important social-
psychological theories of dispute resolution were also developed in labor and organizational contexts.
For important early examples, see RICHARD E. WALTON, INTERPERSONAL PEACEMAKING:
CONFRONTATIONS AND THIRD-PARTY CONSULTATION 2 (1969) (emphasizing the role of emotional
and interdependent relations in complex organizational conflict) and RICHARD E. WALTON & ROBERT
B. McKERSIE, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF LABOR NEGOTIATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF A SOCIAL
INTERACTION SYSTEM 184 (1965) (criticizing bargaining theorists for "not pay[ing] attention to the
attitudinal dimensions of negotiations" and proposing a "social-psychological" analysis of labor
negotiation to correct this gap).
182. ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, SCOTT R. PEPPET & ANDREW S. TULUMELLO, BEYOND WINNING:
NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 44-68 (2000).
183. JAY FOLBERG & DWIGHT GOLANN, LAWYER NEGOTIATION: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND LAW 36-
44,49-58 (2006).
184. See, e.g., Leonard L. Riskin, The Contemplative Lawyer: On the Potential Contributions of
Mindfulness Meditation to Law Students, Lawyers, and Their Clients, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. I
(2002). Like Mnookin, Sander, and Folberg, Riskin taught family law early in his career and in 1982
"devoted three weeks of his Family Law course to divorce mediation." AM. BAR ASS'N, LAW SCHOOL
DIRECTORY OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAMS 21 (Kevi Brannelly et al. eds., 1983). In his widely
cited 1982 article, Mediation and Lawyers, he devoted (in his words) "substantial attention" to family
mediation. Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29,32 (1982).
185. Leonard L. Riskin, Knowing Yourself Mindfulness, in THE NEGOTIATOR'S FIELDBOOK: THE
DESK REFERENCE FOR THE EXPERIENCED NEGOTIATOR 239, 239 (Andrea Kupfer Schneider &
Christopher Honeyman eds., 2006).
186. ROGER FISHER & DANIEL SHAPIRO, BEYOND REASON: USING EMOTIONS AS YOU NEGOTIATE 15
(2005).
187. See, e.g., id. at 3; MNOOKIN, PEPPET & TULUMELLO, supra note 182, at 1-2, 173-74; FOLBERG &
GOLANN, supra note 183, at 2-3.
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communal social good. But neither do they necessarily commend procedural
informalism to evade a "steady stream" of social welfare legislation.' 88 They have
divorced their ambitions from such explicitly political ends: they aim instead to
enable individual disputants to manage the emotional, altruistic, and
simultaneously self-interested relationships that cut across all the spheres of their
existence. How should we evaluate these contributions?
On the one hand, if, as Clare Huntington recently argued, "[t]he curative to
the separate spheres ideology . . . is to see both family and market as affective
sites," 189 then these architects of modem ADR have accomplished an important
analytical feat: they have produced a range of dispute processing techniques for
resolving (commercial, relational) disputes that do not presuppose a sharp divide
between the market and the family. It is worth emphasizing this point. Over the
past two decades, numerous scholars have productively complicated distinctions
between the family and the market. But most have investigated how economics,
care, and intimacy overlap in family domains.'" ADR is significant, I am
arguing, because it imports these imbricated understandings of the family to
reshape how we understand conflict in market domains.
On the other hand, however, and as I suggest in the concluding Part that
follows, it is precisely ADR's apolitical mediations of economic and social logics
that make it compatible with neoliberal projects.' 9'
III. CONCLUSION: MAKING THE MARKET LIKE THE FAMILY
At the same time that ADR proponents were settling how they would
combine social and economic logics into a theory of private dispute resolution, a
similar shift was happening in theoretical writing on the market writ large.
Indeed, in the last two decades, we have witnessed an explosion of efforts that,
like ADR, have introduced new discourses of the social into market-based
exchange-for example, terms like social capital, social networks, and social trust.
Here "the social" is, as neoliberal economic philosopher Friedrich Hayek would
have it, illustrative of interactive and localized human processes.' 92 It is not a
188. Werner, Voluntary Tribunals: A Democratic Ideal for the Adjudication of Private Differences
Which Give Rise to Civil Actions, supra note 85, at 104.
189. Clare Huntington, Embracing the Affective Family, 33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 321, 325 (2010)
(emphasis added).
190. For example, Viviana Zelizer's recent work examines "the processes by which people negotiate
coherent connections between intimacy and cconomic activity" most "notably in the realms of
coupling, caring relations, and household life." VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE PURCHASE OF INTIMACY 2-
4 (2005). In another recent book, Margaret Brinig examined the benefits and drawbacks of applying
"the idea of the market, with its legal analogy of contract," to different kinds and stages of family
relations. MARGARET F. BRINIG, FROM CONTRACT TO COVENANT: BEYOND THE LAW AND
ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY 3 (2000). For both helpful overviews and contributions to this complex
literature, see, e.g., Martha M. Ertman, For Both Love and Money: Viviana Zelizer's The Purchase of
Intimacy, 34 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 1017 (2009) (review essay) and Philomila Tsoukala, Gary Becker,
Legal Feminism, and the Costs of Moralizing Care, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 357 (2007) (analyzing
how feminists have adopted, limited, and/or rejected economic theories of the family and household
labor).
191. Other scholars have observed the recent uptake of ADR in neoliberal discourse. See, e.g., UGO
MATTEI & LAURA NADER, PLUNDER: WHEN THE RULE OF LAW IS ILLEGAL 79 (2008).
192. 2 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 78
(1976).
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normative/redistributivist idea that signifies "that 'society' ought to hold itself
responsible for the particular material position of all its members" (which we saw
at work in the ideology of progressive family court reform).' 93  Nor is it a
normative/functional idea that dictates "that the processes of society should be
deliberately directed to particular results" '94 (made famous in American law by
Roscoe Pound).'95 Rather, in contemporary neoliberal discourse, "the social" is a
descriptive idea used to commend the processes among people who collaborate
successfully to produce both relationships and things.
Strikingly, several writers who understand the market as social in this way
also theorize the family as an important, even paradigmatic, social form. Consider
the following two brief examples. In 1988, James Coleman published an article
widely credited for coining the term social capital.'" In that article, he described
how intra-family (and community) relations-in distinction to material resources
like money or human resources like education-influence children's performance
in schools.'97 Coleman, in turn, used this example of the family to describe what
he famously called capital that is produced through "relations among persons,"
and to challenge dominant depictions of market exchange grounded solely in
principles of utility maximization.'98  "[N]orms, interpersonal trust, social
networks, and social organization," he argued, "are important in the functioning
not only of the society but also of the economy."'
Building on Coleman's ideas, in 1995, Francis Fukuyama argued for the
creation of "a high degree of trust between individuals who [are] not related to one
another, and hence a solid basis for social capital."2 00 He explored how families
produce various forms of sociability by cultivating shared ethical values as well as
how "strong private economic institutions that go beyond the family" (such as
business organizations) can foster similar forms.20' Like ADR proponents, he
argued against the organization of society based primarily on litigation, lawyering,
and policing rather than active human collaboration-the more trust in a society,
the less it requires an "intrusive, rule-making government to regulate social
relations."202 And like Coleman, he challenged descriptions of economic behavior
based exclusively on theories of rational choice and utility maximization.
"[T]here is a mistaken tendency," he claimed, "encouraged by contemporary
economic discourse, to regard the economy as ... a realm in which individuals
come together only to satisfy their selfish needs and desires . . . . But in any
modem society, the economy constitutes one of the most fundamental and
193. Id at 79.
194. Id.
195. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 25 HARV. L.
REV. 140, 140-47 (1911).
196. James S. Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation offHuman Capital, 94 AM. J. Soc. S95 (1988).
For an extensive and enlightening genealogy of the social capital concept, see BEN FINE, SOCIAL
CAPITAL VERSUS SOCIAL THEORY: POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE AT THE TURN OF THE
MILLENNIUM (2001).
197. Coleman, supra note 196, at S109-S 113.
198. Id. at S95-S98, SI00-S101.
199. Id. at S96.
200. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY 57
(1995).
201. Id. at 49.
202. Id. at I1, 51, 361.
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dynamic arenas of human sociability."203 Market exchanges, he argued, are not
simply an instrument, "a means to the end of earning a paycheck but an important
end of human life itself."20 People engage in economic activity "for the sake of
recognition rather than merely as a means of satisfying natural material needs....
Work and money are much more important as sources of identity, status, and
dignity."205 Thus Fukuyama-famous for his claim that liberal capitalism is "the
end of history"2 -envisioned a market economy comprised not of atomistic,
narrowly self-interested individuals but rather of explicitly social forms of
organization. These forms are like the (idealized, well-functioning) family but
"allow unrelated people to collaborate,"207 because they foster "social ties and
moral obligation[s]"2 8 and even "social solidarity" that are not limited to the
family but extend within and across associational, professional, not-for-profit and
for-profit corporate groups.2 0
We can read Fukuyama as providing a large-scale articulation of ADR.210 At
the level of the individual dispute, ADR combines the self-interest of the market
with the kind of voluntary human regard for others that Fisher and Ury (quite
211
charitably) presume is emblematic of marriage. It promises new ideologies of
interpersonal collaboration that are powerful precisely because they disrespect
prior oppositions between self-interest and altruism, rationality and affect, the
market and the family. On a broader conceptual level, ADR deploys (historically
and ideologically) particular understandings of the family as a means of
redescribing the market-that is, as a place of community, social network, and
identity, not simply alienation, selfishness, and greed. Like Fukuyama, ADR
strives to make compatible oppositional logics such as efficiency and social
connection: economic goods are redistributed as relationships, and relationships
are put to the service of economic goods.
In our present political moment of late neoliberalism, these are seductive
harmonizing visions.212 Today, the social dimensions of our collective life have
continued to emerge transformed from state-enforced entitlements, mandatory
obligations, rights and insurance schemes not (or not only) into rational/economic
cost-benefit calculations, but into requirements to cultivate responsible social
203. Id. at 6.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 7.
206. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992).
207. FUKUYAMA, TRUST, supra note 200, at 150.
208. Id. at 56.
209. Id. at 156 (explaining how the social solidarity fostered in families mitigates free riding: "family
members usually contribute to the success of a family enterprise more energetically than if they were
collaborating with strangers and do not worry nearly so much about questions of relative contributions
and benefits").
210. In fact, today, ADR theorists quite explicitly argue that the production of social capital is both a
means and ends of effective dispute system design. See, e.g., NANCY H. ROGERS, ROBERT C.
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relations by market actors themselves: businesses, employers, laborers,
producers, and consumers.213 Yet, as several scholars have observed, the
distributional effects of these new social configurations are at best unclear.214
To return to the topic of this Symposium, the scholarly discourse on ADR has
pursued a long-enduring debate about the "rule of law" and ADR-defined as an
opposition between the public and the private, law and interests, and, by
extension, the state and the market. As I have analyzed elsewhere, in the late
1970s and 1980s, critics mounted a "public/social" attack on ADR.2 15  For
example, famous legal figures such as Owen Fiss sought to defend the social
values embodied by the public state against what he saw as ADR's relentless drive
towards individual utility and efficient exchange embodied by the private
market.216 In these criticisms, adjudication was described as a public and social
process.217 ADR, by contrast, was equated with unadulterated discourses of
individualization, interest maximization, and private capital accumulation.2"
This Article suspended the public/private distinction in order to consider the
family/market one and to discover what ADR proponents themselves envision
when they conceptualize the private sphere. In so doing, it proposes to shift the
terms of the debate. For early architects of ADR, private dispute resolution
extended the social and relational norms of the family into commercial domains.
To be sure, pioneers such as Mnookin, Folberg, or Fisher never made the blurring
of the family/market divide an explicit theme in their work. But, as I have argued
213. See, e.g., Andrea Karin Muchlebach, The Moral Neoliberal: Welfare State and Ethical
Citizenship in Contemporary Italy, at xvii-xix (June 2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University
of Chicago) (arguing that the Italian welfare state "is shifting away from a public, state-mediated moral
order" where citizens are bound through rights and political ties to a "privatized, diffuse moral order"
where citizens are bound through affective relations of care and duty); Nikolas Rose, Community,
Citizenship, and the Third Way, 43 AM. BEHAvIORAL SCIENTIST 1395, 1395 (2000) (describing "the
emergence of a new politics of conduct that seeks to reconstruct citizens as moral subjects of
responsible communities").
214. See, e.g., Lisa T. Alexander, Stakeholder Participation in New Governance: Lessons From.
Chicago's Public Housing Reform Experiment, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 117, 174-75
(2009) (illustrating the "limits of stakeholder collaboration" in public housing reform to advance the
interests of marginalized groups); Cdsar A. Rodriguez-Garavito, Global Governance and Labor
Rights: Codes of Conduct and Anti-Sweatshop Struggles in Global Apparel Factories in Mexico and
Guatemala, 33 POL. & Soc'Y 203, 204-06 (2005) (critically analyzing the conditions under which
codes of conduct can in fact protect the interests of labor versus those of management); Paul M.
Secunda, The Perils of Procedurally Regulating Self-Regulation, 64 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 203,
204 (2010) (book review) (arguing against any form collaborative workplace self-regulation without
union representation); David A. Super, Laboratories ofDestitution: Democratic Experimentalism and
the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 546-48 (2009) (arguing that decentralized,
collaborative, participatory forms of anti-poverty policymaking have harmed the interests of low-
income people).
215. See Cohen, supra note 3.
216. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 3, at 128 ("Today we feel increasing doubts about the existence of
public values . . . and the dispute resolution model of adjudication, like the night-watchman state,
accommodates those doubts. Both afford an easy haven for all those who would deny or minimize the
role of public values in our social life and the need for governmental power to realize those values.").
217. Owen M. Fiss, Forward: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1979); Harry T.
Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668, 676-78
(1986).
218. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 3, at 122-23, 127-28 (describing the "dispute resolution model of
adjudication"); Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984); see also Cohen,
supra note 3, at 1148-57.
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here, it had a significant organizing effect on how they created the field. Today,
defenders of ADR disrespect the public/private divide in precisely the same way
their predecessors disrespected the family/market one. ADR, they argue against
their critics, can generate the forms of human connection and social relationships
that undergird and justify the functions of the public state. As our Symposium
convener Richard Reuben recently put it, ADR can promote "the constructive
social capital that is necessary to support the rule of law" and "effective
democratic rule."219
Reuben's argument does not answer public/social criticisms of ADR-rather,
it illustrates the complex analytical work that the idea of "the social" today
performs. To recap: critics, such as Fiss, have described ADR as private and
therefore individuating and market-based. Proponents, such as Reuben, have
answered that ADR is in fact (like the family) social and relational. But what
neither side appears to address is that the market is now regularly described as
social, affective, and relational too. Or to put this point another way, from a
perspective concerned with distributive justice, the problem is not that ADR is
privatizing and therefore individualizing and de-socializing. This Article has
argued that as a technique of private ordering, modern ADR was never about
individual efficiency dislocated from relational concerns. The potential problem
instead is that ADR is depolicitizing. ADR's greatest value is also its greatest
danger: it relentlessly collapses binaries-public/private, social/economic,
family/market-in order to integrate positions where some would want law and
others direct action to fight out interests that in the real world are often stubbornly,
even violently, opposed. The challenge for contemporary ADR critics and
proponents, then, is as it always was: attention to distribution and power. It
appears that today, however, we must analyze the distributional effects of private
ordering regimes that, like ADR (or like contemporary theories of the market), are
potentially hegemonic-they have already absorbed the oppositional social logics
that once served as a source of market critique.
219. Richard C. Reuben, How ADR Can Foster the Rule of Law- Beyond the Fundamental Tension,
October 15, 2010, http://law.missouri.edu/csdr/symposium/rol/docs/RichardReuben.pdf (last visited
March 15, 2011) (emphasis added); Reuben, supra note 3, at 5; cf Robert A. Baruch Bush, Mediation
and Adjudication, Dispute Resolution and Ideology: An Imaginary Conversation, 3 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 1, 6, 15 (1989) (arguing that critics miss "the public-value argument for mediation"
grounded in relationality and concern for others).
[Vol. 2011126
